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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It is trite law that the United States antitrust law
extends to activities abroad that substantially affect her
domestic commerce. 1 An Avalanche of jurisprudence as well as
legal literature abounds on the subject. 2 Currently, the
notion of applying national competition law to external
activities impacting domestic commerce, a US invention, 3 has
gained international acceptance in today's liberalized
world, as a necessary mechanism for protecting domestic
markets against imported private restraints. 4 Even countries
1
Apart from the first judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 23 U.S. 347 (1909) which cautiously declined to apply the US antitrust to events occurring wholly in
Costa Rica, most subsequent judicial pronouncements follow the later United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America 148 F.2d 416 in uniformly accepting that section 1 and 2 of the Act enjoy both domestic and
foreign applications. See also; Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9 th Cir. 1976);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
"See for e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict ofLaws, International
Law, and Some Suggestions for their Interaction, Recueil des Cours 3 1 5 (1980); Gary B. Born, A Appraisal
of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1 (1992); David Gill, Two Cheersfor
Timberlane, 10 Swiss Rev. Int'l, Comp. L.3 (1980); David P. Fidler, Competition Law and International
Relations, 41 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 563 (1992); Russell J. vveintraub. The Extraterritorial Application of
Antitrust & Security Laws: An inquiry into the Utility ofa "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 Tex. L. Rev.
1799 (1992). For more recent work on the subject, see, James S. McNeill, Extraterritorial Antitrust
Jurisdiction: Continuing the Confusion in Policy, Law, and Jurisdiction, 28 Cal. W. Int'l L. J. 425 (1998)
and note, Jennifer C. Farlow, Ego or Equity 9 Examining United States Extension of the Sherman Act, 1
1
Transnat'l Law. 175(1998).
J
See §.1 and 2 of The Sherman Act.
This situation is probably fuelled by the absence of an accepted antitrust law at the global level. See,
Daniel J. Gifford, The Draft International Antitrust Code Proposed at Munich: Good Intentions Gone
Awry, 6 Minn. J. Global Trade 1 (1997) (One major reason why internationally negotiated competition law
standard is being sought within the WTO is because of the realization by states that " privately exclusionary
arrangements can potentially effectively neutralize the market-opening efforts undertaken by
governments...")
without specific extraterritorial provisions in their
competition laws, in practice enforce their competition
laws against external activities affecting local commerce. 5
The notion of extraterritoriality finds support in the
customary international law principle of "territoriality,"
which recognizes the sovereign's right to legislate: a)
over its citizens anywhere in the world and b) over events
occurring outside its domain undertaken by foreigners;
provided that those actions were intended to, and did in
fact, result in domestic consequences. 6
Despite the seeming international realization of the
inevitability of antitrust extraterritoriality in today's
global economy, and even though similarities have emerged
in core antitrust regulation around the world, 7
international standardization on either the substance or
5
See; the European Court of Justice decision in Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. E.C.
Commission [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901; where the court applied art. 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty on
competition to acts occurring abroad and undertaken by foreign, mostly US export association members;
also in ICI v. Commission (Dyestuffs), Case 48/69, 172 E.C.R. 619, the European Commission (EU's
competition enforcement agency) argues that jurisdiction of the Community is justified by reason of
economic effects that the claimant's conduct produced in the Common market); In FTC v. Nippon Kcgaku
KcgyC KK, 4 Shinketsushu 30, 46 (FTC, Sept. 3, 1952), the Japanese Court adjudicated on a matter
involving external activities likely to affect domestic market, but dismissed the case on grounds that the
effect was not sufficiently substantial for a finding of violation. See also; Geralyn Trujillo, Mutual
Assistance Under the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act: Obstacles to a United States-
Japanese Agreement, 33 Tex. Int'l L. J. 613 at page 623 (1998); Robert D. Shank, The Justice
Department 's Recent Antitrust Enforcement Policy: Toward a "Positive Comity " Solution to International
Competition Problems?" 29 Vand. J. Transnaf 1. 155 at page 172. (1996) The author names EU, Australia,
Germany, Canada, France and the Czech and Slovak Republics as some of the Countries currently
enforcing their antitrust laws to external anticompetitive activities.
6
See, The S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10. (The Lotus Case).
For instance, nearly every jusirsdiction in the world now regulates against cartels. See, Eleanor M. Fox,
Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 Pac. Rim L.
&Pol'yJ- 1 (1995).
3procedure of competition law is yet to occur. 8 Curiously,
while many advanced economies, especially those within the
European Communities, support the idea of internationally
negotiated codes within the World Trade Organization (WTO)
,
the US has maintained a lone resistance in this area. 9
The United States does not encourage global antitrust,
but instead, has traditionally vied for inter-governmental
cooperation in cross-border enforcement and adherence to
the non-binding guidelines reached within the consensus-
based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), 10 as alternatives to forging an international
standard. 11 The US contends that cooperative enforcement
amongst antitrust authorities would work to effectively
ease the tension and acrimony usually accompanying attempts
Note however, that there has been a relatively long history of attempts in creating a global system of
antitrust from the premature International Trade Organization (ITO), United Nations, OECD and now
WTO.
See, Hon. Christine A. Vamey, US FTC Commissioner, The Federal Trade Commission and
International Antitrust. 1 1-22-96 WLN 12497(1996).
For a detailed analysis providing possible reasons for United States' morbid fear against substantive
international antitrust, see Spencer Weber Waller, National Laws and International Markets: Strategies of
Cooperation and Harmonization in the Enforcement of Competition Law, 1 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 1111 (1996)
(where the author claims that there are two outstanding reasons: "a reluctance to cede turf to majontarian
international organizations where the United States cannot block hostile action, and a reluctance to permit
open season on American businesses by those same international organizations").
. See also, Joseph
Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 Antitrust L.J. 1 59 at 197, (1999)
where the author sets out four reasons why authorities in the US are opposed to internationally negotiated
competition rules within WTO framework. But see; Eleanor M. Fox, supra, note 7, Diane P. Wood, The
Impossible Dream: Real international Antitrust, 1992 U. Chi. Legal F. 277 (1992); for a detailed discussion
on factors militating against the adoption of substantive international antitrust law.
See, Hon. Christine A. Varney, supra, note 9 (The honorable commissioner claims that international
antitrust is not necessary because countries are yet to plumb "the dept of possibilities of cooperation
between sovereign enforcement authorities."
by states to enforce their competition laws abroad. 12 It has
been asserted that the real reason why the US prefers
cooperation in this area is to "diffuse any movement toward
an international competition system." 13 Over the years, the
US authorities have feared that an international framework
could constitute "ceding turf" over its antitrust
administration to some international body compromising its
long held authority in the area. 14
It is hardly necessary today to dwell on the question
whether the time for international harmonization of
competition law has arrived. 15 Several treatises dealing
with that issue have established some agreement. 16 Instead
of focusing mainly on developing a bilateral mechanism for
cooperative enforcement, the United States should also
seriously consider that forging some sort of multilateral
" Id. ("we have not yet plumbed the depth of possibilities of cooperation between sovereign enforcement
authorities.")
J
See, Spencer Weber Waller, supra, note 10 at 1119. ("The United States has staked its policy for the
foreseeable future on this type of cooperation as an alternative to either unilateralism, harmonization, or the
creation of a true international antitrust law. [It has] opposed every international initiative to address
competition law.)
Id. at 1 128. (Author maintained that the basis for US quest for cooperation is its "reluctance to cede turf
to majontanan international organizations where the United States cannot block hostile action, and a
reluctance to permit open season on American businesses by those same international organizations.")
" This goes without saying. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization ofAntitrust
Enforcement, 77 B.U.L. Rev. 343 (1997).
b
See for e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, Id.; Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible 9 73
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1501 (1998); Eleanor M. Fox, supra, note 10; Diane P. Wood, supra, note 10; Eleanor M.
Fox, Trade, Competition, And Intellectual Property - TRIPS and Its Antitrust Counterparts, 29 Vand. J.
Transnafl L. 481 (1996); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New
Protectionism: The Needfor a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 393 (1996); Daniel
J. Gifford, The Draft International Antitrust Code Proposed at Munich: Good Intentions Gone Awry, 6
Minn. J. Global Trade 1 (1997).
arrangement would deepen international cooperation and
could result in better global antitrust enforcement.
It is the focus of this paper to critically evaluate
the cooperative enforcement option proffered by the US
authorities with a view to judging its attractiveness to
other nations and its adequacy in solving problems posed by
extraterritoriality in today's highly liberalized economy.
In this regard, we shall see that the various models of
cooperative enforcement arrangements adopted within the
United States have failed to result in productive bilateral
cooperation. This is due in large part, to the commitment
of individual countries to satisfying national interests
over cooperative obligations arising under the agreements.
Because of these insufficiencies, the paper reiterates the
need for the US to actively partake in the ongoing effort
within the WTO to forge global competition law.
While agreeing that the WTO dispute settlement
framework may encounter serious difficulties in enforcing
binding competition rules against member countries or
appropriately exercising appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of national competition authorities, the paper
sets out certain characteristics which a multilateral
agreement within the WTO should possess in order to escape
national opposition and at the same time make for
integrated global competition.
This paper is made up of five Parts. Part I traces the
origin of extraterritoriality in US antitrust law by
examining changing judicial attitude towards the extension
of the Sherman Act abroad. The first section of Part II
briefly catalogues international reaction to the reach of
the Sherman Act into foreign territories. This is followed
by a descriptive analysis of the various counter-measures
adopted by countries to thwart US extraterritorial
antitrust enforcement. Secondly, an outline of attempts
made by US Courts, Congress and enforcement agencies (DOJ &
FTC) in both attempting to clarify the law and/or tempering
the effects of its extra- jurisdictional application in the
face of international criticism would be considered. Part
III opens with a discussion on the Cooperative Enforcement
Agreements as a solution. Without necessarily
underestimating the relevance of cooperation amongst
antitrust enforcement agencies, the paper laments the
cooperative framework of the United States antitrust law, 17
which has little chance of resulting in actual inter-
country cooperative enforcement because:
' The US framework for cooperation includes the judicial requirements for comity considerations as in
Timberlane, infra, statutes (FTAIA & IAEAA infra) and enforcement guidelines requiring cooperation and
reciprocal assistance m antitrust enforcement.
• The judiciary has failed miserably in uniformly
interpreting US international antitrust
jurisdictions. The courts are thus riddled with
inconsistent and unpredictable analysis.
• Deliberate congressional omission to specifically
delineate jurisdictional parameters in the various
antitrust legislation, while focusing exclusively on
prosecutorial information gathering under the IAEAA
hardly attracts countries.
• Provisions on comity in the relevant statutes fail
to adequately ensure that interests of other
countries would be considered.
In Part IV, the future of extraterritoriality in the
21 st Century would be considered. There are no indications
that countries would refrain from applying their
competition laws to events or persons abroad. On the
contrary, countries are now concerned more than ever before
that private foreign restraints could negatively affect
domestic competition and imperil domestic economies. Within
the US, the landscape for extraterritoriality has broadened
beyond the traditional areas of antitrust and securities
laws to include Trade Marks, Franchise, and Drug
Trafficking etc. This indicates a growing awareness that
enforcement of national laws on a strictly territorial
basis would no longer be sufficient in the near future to
meet the objectives of several laws of countries, including
the United States. A brief outline of global efforts to
standardize competition law will be attempted, as well as a
consideration of some regional and bilateral arrangements
in this regard. A model of multilateral agreement adopted
8in this regard. A model of multilateral agreement adopted
within the WTO, based on the acceptance of certain core
antitrust principles by states would be outlined. Because
this scheme makes the adoption of global rules on antitrust
possible without the necessity of immediately subjecting
them to supranational adjudication, it stands out as one
arrangement that could be accepted with minimal objections
by states. Finally, this section concludes with the
consideration of a WTO-based mechanism under which some
form of transnational enforcement could be achieved
irrespective of the peculiar nature of antitrust law and
enforcement. Section V would contain the paper's
conclusions, mainly, that the inability of cooperative
enforcement framework in the US to produce desired results
coupled with the necessity for continuous
extraterritoriality in today's liberalized world requires
multilateral, as opposed to, bilateral or national solution
to inter-country competition.
EVOLUTION OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every
contract, combination, ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among several States, or with foreign
nations . " 18 While section 2 prohibits monopolies, attempted
monopolies, or conspiracies to monopolize "any part of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations . " 19 Though these provisions clearly imply external
application, the courts in the early days of US antitrust
law development denied that Sherman Act had
extraterritorial coverage over wholly foreign acts. 20
However, in a 1945 decision, the court in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 21 would alter the course of US
antitrust history by giving birth to antitrust
extraterritoriality. 22
However, due to vehement protests from foreign
authorities and international bodies, coupled with
extensive systematic retaliatory measures against the US
abroad, 2 subsequent courts felt the need to temper the law
by integrating some comity considerations in order to
ls
Emphasis mine.
' Emphasis mine.
"° In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), the Supreme Court determined that
US antitrust laws did not extend beyond its borders because Congress did not indicate an intend to apply
the Act extratemtonally. See also, James S. McNeill, supra, note 2. The author claims that the prevailing
international view at the time that a nation had exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own
boundary and the fact that the act in question was legal in the foreign country, Costa Rica, mitigated against
extending jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.
21 148F.2d416(2dCir. 1945)
"" For the first time, a US court extended the application of the Sherman Act to activities occurring outside
the United States under the so called "effects doctrine."
" For a detailed discussion on international reaction and retaliatory measures, see Part II infra.
10
reduce international tension and breathe some meaning into
the effects doctrine. 24
In Timberlane I, 25 the court adopted a "tripartite
analysis" for determining subject matter jurisdiction. 26 It
involved a balancing of series of factors, including
international concerns, before assuming jurisdiction in a
case alleging extraterritorial anticompetitive conducts. 27
In Mannington Mills, 28 the court went a step further by
requiring that even where a Timberlane- type analysis
results in a determination that subject matter jurisdiction
exists, the court could voluntarily decline jurisdiction if
it found compelling international interests. 29
The views comprised in the foregoing cases held sway
in the courts until 1993 when the Supreme Court, in
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 30 considered the
comity issue and its effect on the exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction over foreign anticompetitive conducts.
See for e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9 th Cir. 1976); Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) and Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
J
5
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9^ Cir. 1976)
"6
Id. at 613. (To determine subject matter jurisdiction, the court must consider that, 1. Sherman Act
jurisdiction requires an mtended or actual effect on American foreign commerce, 2. Plaintiff must show-
that a cognizable injury exists to which United States antitrust laws should apply, 3. Reconcile domestic
and foreign interests under the so called "jurisdictional rule of reason" analysis).
27
Id.
28
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979)
29
Id. at 1296-98. But see, Laker Airways Ltd. V. Sabena, 73 1 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Where the court
held that where an external conduct substantially effect United States commerce, concurrent jurisdiction
exists and exercising jurisdiction by the US courts under such circumstances is not extraterritorial but based
upon the territoriality principle).
30
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
11
In view of the two preceding cases, a rather strange
analysis ensued. After affirming that effects on US
commerce is still the determining factor for exercising
subject matter jurisdiction, the court went into an unusual
analysis of comity considerations and formulated the so
called "true conflict analysis," to the effect that where
there is no real conflict of law between the US and foreign
law, balancing comity issues is unnecessary. 31 To that end,
it asserted that where a "person subject to regulation by
two states can comply with the laws of both," no true
conflict exists and subject matter jurisdiction should not
be relinquished. 32
Not only did the supreme court's tenacious hold on
jurisdiction obliterate comity considerations in the
determination of jurisdiction in these line of cases, it
also failed to stipulate when if ever, would a court find
comity issues strong enough to decline jurisdiction. As a
result, confusion continues to loom in this area. 33
31
Id. at 795-96.
32
Id. at 799.
See e.g., Metro Industries v. Sammi Corporation, 82 F.3d 839 (1996), (Court ruled that Timberlane
comity analysis factors were still relevant. In a footnote it stated: "While Hartford Fire Ins. overruled our
holding in Timberlane II that a foreign government's encouragement of conduct which the United States
prohibits would amount to a conflict of law. it did not question the propriety of the jurisdictional rule of
reason or the seven comity factors set forth in Timberlane I"); United States v. Nippon Paper Industries
Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8-9 (l
sl
Cir. 1977), (commenting on the role of comity considerations m determining
jurisdiction, the court stated that "its growth in the antitrust sphere has been stunted by Hartford Fire"); In
re Maxwell, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1994), (International comity concerns precluded application of
American law after a combination of Hartford and Timberlane-type analysis revealed the existence of a true
conflict of law between the US and British law); (established that the existence of "a true conflict of law as
12
The reign of Sherman Act extraterritoriality has
equally been strengthened both by congressional actions and
activities of the executive branch responsible for
implementing the US antitrust law. Two prominent
legislation have been enacted to clarify the basis under
which US antitrust is extended abroad on one hand 34 and
encourage cooperative enforcement by granting powers to the
DOJ and FTC to negotiate with their foreign counterparts
for a coordinated enforcement framework between them, on
the other. 35 Combined DOJ/FTC antitrust enforcement
guidelines for International Operation has been published
periodically from 1977. The current guideline, released in
1995, 36 like the previous ones have made important
contributions towards enlightening corporations operating
internationally of applicable antitrust laws as well as the
category of foreign conduct that might incur antitrust
enforcement actions. 37
the threshold requirement... of any international comity analysis"). See also, James Mcneill, supra, note 2
at 443. The author regrets that even after Hartford, results of an action claiming violation of the Sherman
Act by a foreign actor may depend in large part on the circuit chosen.
See, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, 1982.
35
See, The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, 1994.
United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations, reprinted in 68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1707
(Special Supp.) (Apr.6, 1995).
CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS AND COUNTER-MEASURES
United States' extension of the Sherman act abroad
understandably outraged many nations across the globe. 38 The
positions of majority of states affected by this were
nearly congruent. 31 It was considered a breach of
international law and an unjustifiable basis for the
exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction. 40
Secondly, United States' unique antitrust enforcement
mechanism and judicial remedial system differ greatly from
those practiced by most other nations. 41 The US antitrust is
characterized by "jury trial, wide-ranging pretrial
discovery without judicial supervision, enforcement by
private plaintiffs, extraterritorial discovery, treble
damages, class actions, contingent fees, lack of
" Id. See also, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines to International Operations (Jan. 26, 1977), reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) P 13, 110 and Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
(1988). reprinted in 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)No. 1391, s 4.1 atS-21 (Nov. 17, 1988).
This act was seen a show of force by the United States and an affront to country's sovereign rights.
v
See, Prabhaker Reddy, The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Law and the United Kingdom 's
Reaction, 3 Emory J. Int'l Disp. Resol. 221 (1989).
u
Id. [In a diplomatic note sent to the US government in July 1978, the British government stated that, "His
Majesty's Government considers that in the present state of international law there is no basis for the
extension of one country's antitrust jurisdiction to activities outside of that country of foreign nationals].
See, Joseph Griffin, Foreign Government Reactions to US Assertions ofExtraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 505 at 516 (1998).
13
14
contribution among co-conspirators, and criminal liability
for violations of competition law." 42
Also, though the courts averred to international
comity factors, the circuits were not unanimous on how
those factors would determine jurisdiction in every case 43
and the "jurisdictional rule of reason" analysis seemed to
portray that subject matter jurisdiction already exists for
the US courts to reject. 44 Finally, there is the question of
judicial meddling. Judicial competence in assessing
diplomatic, national security and international economic
issues presumably undertaken by US courts under the
jurisdictional rule of reason analysis is questionable. 45
Even if judges were able to exercise those economic-
political functions, it is generally believed that the
proper avenue for resolving such conflicts should be
through inter-governmental consultation and negotiation
instead of the courts. 46 Expressing doubt that the judiciary
can properly assess disparate state interests between two
nations, the Australian Attorney General remarked;
"It is not merely that the courts lack the expertise.
It is not part of the judicial function to decide whether a
law or policy is necessary and justified by what it
conceives to be the national interest. That is the
42
Id.
See, James McNeill supra, note 2.
Joseph Griffin, supra, note 42 at 519.
45
Id.
40
Id.
15
political. It is even more difficult if a court were to
attempt that task in relation to the law or policy of a
foreign country. In large measure, what a State conceives
to be important depends upon the values of that society, as
for example, whether and to what extent it wishes to
protect its environment. Even where the law is based upon
ostensibly objective considerations as, for example, the
trading law of a country, it is not procedurally
practicable to establish the significance of that law to
the national interest in a court of law. Consider only the
mass of facts of an economic character which such a case
would need to be proved." 47
The Canadian government expressed similar views
"Where a transnational antitrust issue is really a
manifestation of a policy between national governments, it
should be recognized that there may be no applicable
international law to resolve the conflict. In such cases
resolution should be sought through the normal methods of
consultation and negotiation. For one government to seek to
resolve the conflicts in its favor by invoking its national
law before its domestic tribunals is not the rule of law
but an application, in judicial guise, of the principle
that economic might is right." 48
When diplomatic exchanges failed to yield results,
affected states resorted to statutory means to frustrate US
antitrust enforcements in their domestic systems. The first
categories of laws enacted were directed at hampering
pretrial discoveries for use in US courts. 49 Later certain
classes of antitrust proceedings became targets of
legislation designed to impede discoveries in those
Quoted in Joseph Griffin, Id. at 520.
48
Id.
49
See, Business Records Protection Act, R.S.O., ch. 54 (1950) (Can.).
16
specific categories. 50 These kinds of laws were followed by
broader enactments making certain types of US antitrust
judgment unenforceable in foreign courts. 31 In addition,
there were legislative measures creating statutory causes
of action called "Clawback Statutes" 5, to enable foreign
defendants recover excess damages paid in satisfaction of
US treble damages judgment. 53 The extent of retribution
differed according to country; in France for instance, a
1980 law made it a crime to request certain kind of
information located within its territorial domain in order
to impede US discovery process there. 54 At least one
international organization called on its members to
formulate a policy against US antitrust extraterritoriality
and adopt a coordinated resistance to its treble damage
judgments in their respective nations. 55
As a result of all the foregoing measures, the US
antitrust administration faced tremendous institutional and
legal huddles in their attempts to enforce antitrust law
against foreign defendants in violation of the Sherman Act.
In view of these difficulties, various attempts were made
u
See, e.g.. Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87 (Eng.)
51
See, e.g.. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. 49 (1985) (Can.)
" See, Joseph E. Neuhaus, Power to Reverse Foreign Judgments The British Clawback Statute Under
International Law, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1097 (1981).
53
See, e.g., the Protection of Trading Interest Act, 1980, ch. 1 1 (Eng.), 21 I.L.M. 834.
54
See, Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1*980.
33
See, Joseph Neuhaus, supra, note 52.
17
within the United States to temper the law on
extraterritoriality to make it more responsive to foreign
criticism. 56 Most of the initial action occurred within the
judiciary. Congress is also credited with two specific
legislations in this regard, while the executive agencies
enforcing antitrust have also made important
contributions. 57 In general, actions taken underline the
need to respect sovereign integrity of other states and
encourage the utilization of proper procedures in
constructively resolving inter-state conflicts whenever
they arise. 58
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
As seen earlier, judicial interpretations of the
Sherman Act denied extraterritorial application of US
antitrust at the outset. 59 This stance was seen as
representing a mark of that era, where sovereignty concerns
dictated near absolute respect for territorial boundaries
of states. A lot changed between that period and the
1940' s: the stock market crashed in 1929, the Great
Depression occurred in the 1930' s, followed by the New Deal
57
This was the basis for formulating comity considerations by the courts.
From 1977, the DOJ and FTC release joint operational guidelines on international antitrust, see 1977,
1988, 1994 Guidelines, infra.
See, Roscoe B. Starek, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement and Other International
Antitrust Developments. 11-29-96 WLN 12731 (Nov. 1996).
18
Era and its American commercial aggressiveness, World War
II had ended with American victory, the United Nations was
formed, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) was signed; a new era of increased international
trade activities and cross-border businesses arrived. When
Alcoa came up for determination in 1945, the stage was
already set for the reversal of American Banana Company
60decision
.
While some authors regard Alcoa as marking a
revolutionary change in the jurisdictional thoughts of
American courts, 61 case law points instead to a slow but
steady development in US courts culminating in antitrust
extraterritoriality based on domestic "effects." 62 Just four
years following the American Banana case, the supreme court
decided in United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway &
Navigation Co., 63 that jurisdiction cannot be defeated
simply because one of the defendants is foreign, when parts
of the alleged conduct affected the United States. 64 Also,
in Thomsen v. Cayser, 6 though an agreement to fix prices
was formed abroad between a South African and US party,
See, American Banana, Supra.
ou 148F.2d416(2dCir. 1945).
See, Edward L. Rholl, Inconsistent Application of the Extraterritorial Provisions of the Sherman Act: A
Judicial Response based Upon the Much Maligned "Effects " Test, 73 Marq. L. Rev. 435 at 441 (1990).
62
See, United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 105-06.
65 243 U.S. 66(1917).
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Justice McKenna held that the court had subject matter
jurisdiction because the alleged conspiracy was effectuated
in New York. 66 In another erosion of American Banana
decision, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Sisal
Sales Corp., 6 that though the alleged illegal conduct
occurred in Mexico and involved that sovereign' s statutory
activity, US jurisdiction is not affected since the alleged
combination affected United States commerce and some of the
conducts occurred in the United States. 68 In all these
cases, although American Banana was not expressly
distinguished, principles closely linking "effects" and
"intent" to the exercise of jurisdiction were common in the
courts' analysis. 6 Eventually, Alcoa would encompass both
the sentiments of the time and those legal developments.
In Alcoa, the court finally established the
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act based on the
"intended effects test." This device for determining
extension of jurisdiction is premised on whether the
foreign conduct was meant to produce or did produce
substantial effect in the United States. 70 As we have seen
66
Id. at 88.
6
~274 U.S. 268(1927).
68
Id. at 276
b9
See, Id. where Justice McReynolds stated that the defendants "by their own deliberate acts, here and
elsewhere ... brought about forbidden results within the United States." Relying on effects and deliberate
intention to found jurisdiction. This would be become apparent in Alcoa.
70
See, Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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earlier, this unilateral extension of the Sherman Act to
activities occurring abroad and/or to foreign nationals
based on domestic effect in the US resulted in
international outrage and counteracting legislation from
various countries. 71 The atmosphere was tense with strong
tendencies of jeopardizing diplomatic and trade relations
with most US trading partners. In order to reduce this
international tension, the US Federal courts fashioned
principles of judicial restraints. 72
In Timberlane Lumber Co., v. Bank of America,' where a
conspiracy was formed in Honduras to prevent Timberlane
from shipping Honduran timber to the United States, the
Ninth Circuit court of Appeals embarked on a tripartite
analysis to determine jurisdiction instead of instantly
exercising jurisdiction under Alcoa's "effects" doctrine.
This Timberlane 's "rule of reason" analysis was the
first meaningful attempt to create a rule of United States
antitrust jurisdiction that took international concerns
fully into account; it considered both comity factors and
conf licts-of -laws principles. It was a product of judicial
ingenuity that had no legislative precedence. 74
See the section on International Reaction and Counter-Measures, supra.
" See, Thomas Schoenbaum supra, note 16 at 432.
73 549 F.2d 597 (9* Cir. 1976).
Timberlane's rule of reason analysis later formed the basis of a foreign relations law. See, American Law-
Institute (ALI) Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, sections 402 and 403.
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The third Circuit, in Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 75 followed Timberlane but added a further
restraint; that though the effects test and Timberlane -type
analysis may favor exercising jurisdiction by a US court,
the court could decline jurisdiction if it found that
compelling international interest would be affected. 75 Thus,
Mannington added the "possible effect on foreign relations"
aspect to the comity considerations and the emerging rule
has come to be regarded as the "jurisdictional rule of
reason.
"
7
The Supreme Court in 1993 appeared to continue in this
spirit of evaluating international concerns in Hartford
Fire Insurance v. California, 7 but concluded rather
confusingly that comity considerations are not necessary
except where there is a "true conflict" of laws between the
two states. 79 According to the court, when a "person subject
to regulation by two states can comply with laws of both,"
there is no such conflict. 8 ' Instead of resolving
jurisdictional conflict by introducing a standard test to
guide the circuits, the Supreme Court interjected further
confusion and uncertainty into an area of law already
75 595 F.2d 1287 (3d. Cir. 1979).
76
Id. at 1294.
See, James McNeill, supra, note 2.
78 509 U.S. 764(1993).
79
Id.
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plagued by circuit-specific and conflicting jurisdictional
analysis. As a result, the court has been criticized for
compounding jurisdictional difficulties; circumscribing
comity considerations by approximating them with act of
state or sovereign compulsion defenses; 81 ignoring the
limits placed on US jurisdiction by public international
law; 82 narrowing the inquiry into the balance of domestic
and international interests; 83 and finally, providing an
incentive for foreign nations to invoke their blocking
statutes or enact laws that would render compliance with US
antitrust law impossible in order to create the "true
conflict" requirement needed to defy US jurisdiction. 84
The jurisdictional confusion created by the Supreme
Court in the Hartford case led to the resurgence of
Timberlane-type analysis in subsequent cases. For instance,
in Metro Indus. V. Sammi Corp., 85 the Ninth Circuit held
that comity considerations were still appropriate even
after Hartford Fire because, the Supreme Court "did not
question the propriety of the jurisdictional rule of reason
80
Id.
James McNeill, supra, note 2 at 441
.
" See, e.g. Adian Robertson & Mane Demetnou, "But That was in Another Country: " The Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court, 43 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 417 (1994).
J
See. John H Chung, The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 and the Maelstrom
Surrounding the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 371 at 398 (1996).
84 Edmund Hosker, First Secretary, British Embassy, Remarks to the Int'l Bar Ass'n (Oct. 12, 1993),
reported in Nat'l L. J., Nov.l, 1993, at 17.
85 82F.3d839(1996)
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or the seven comity factors set forth in Timberiane I." 86
Relying on the jurisdictional rule of reason, the court
declined to exercise jurisdiction.
However, in United States v. Nippon Paper Industries
Co., 8 the court extended jurisdiction over a Japanese
company for acts committed abroad on grounds that those
acts had "substantial" and "intended" effect on the United
States. 88 In denying the defendants appeal to international
comity, the court doubted the continued relevance of comity
by asserting that, "comity is more an aspiration than a
fixed rule, more a matter of grace than a matter of
obligation. In all events, its growth in the antitrust
sphere has been stunted by Hartford Fire." 89
It is to the credit of judicial restraint that the
limited views expressed in Nippon on comity factors are not
shared by all the circuits. In re Maxwell, 90 the second
circuit overlooked Hartford Fire and reverted to the
jurisdictional rule of reason, upholding comity as
precluding US jurisdiction. 91 In the same vein, Judge Haight
reasoned in Filetech S.A.R.L v. France Telecom, 92 that once
86
Id. at 846 i1.5.
87
88
89
109F.3d 1
Id.
Id.
8-9 (1st Cir. 1997).
90
91
93
Id.
F.3dl036(2dCir. 1994).
92 978 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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the "true conflict of law" requirement is met, comity
analysis follows the same factors as Timberlane I and
Restatement (Third). 53
Thus, though the latest Supreme Court case on the
subject seem to have curtailed the impact of comity factors
in the determination of jurisdiction, later cases from the
circuits signify that courts have yet to relinquish
evaluating foreign interests concerns in their
extraterritorial jurisdictional assessments. To that end,
principles of judicial restraints continue to influence the
court's decision.
CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
Judicial attempts to harmonize jurisdictional
rationales may have failed mainly because judicial
institutions are not equipped to handle such complex
political tasks as balancing domestic and international
interests, which the various comity tests seemed to
require. 94 Congress on the other hand, has the time and
resources to adopt a solution as well as the ability to
create a mechanism that will effectuate appropriate
93
Id. at 481-82.
See, John Chung, supra, note 83 at 403-04. ("The weighing and balancing of sensitive global interests
should not be conducted by a body that relies on an exclusively legal analysis.")
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remedies in the circumstance. 9 In recent times, Congress
has stepped in with two significant measures: the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982 and the Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994. However, rather than
assist in resolving the jurisdictional debacle in
international antitrust enforcement, these two laws have
exacerbated judicial confusion over antitrust
extraterritoriality. 96
a. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act 1982
In 1982, when the effects of the then Timberlane I
decisions was still reverberating around the Globe and
international reactions had assumed the form of blocking
legislations, Congress enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act (hereinafter FTAIA) to clarify US policy
over the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.
The Act was also a response to pressure from US exporters
who complained that US antitrust laws placed them in a
disadvantaged position against foreign competitors. 97 Thus,
it prohibited anticompetitive activities abroad that
substantially affect US exports. 9 As was expected, the act
95
Id. at 404.
96
Id.
' See, Dean Brockbank, The 1995 International Antitrust Guidelines: The Reach of US Antitrust Law
Continues to Expand, 2 J. Int'l Legal Stud.l at 16 (1996).
In the same vein. Congress enacted the Export Trading Act 1982 to further protect US exporters by
expanding the Webb-Pomerene-type antitrust exemptions for US exporters. See, Robert G. Shimp, A
Critical Review of the Justice Department 's J 988 Antitrust Guidelinesfor International Operations, 14
N.C.J Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 287 at 304 (1989).
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primarily protected US consumers and exporters without any
measure of protection extended to foreign consumers or
producers .
"
The act maintains the effects doctrine by effectively
codifying Alcoa. It is structured as a denial of
jurisdiction to US courts over extraterritorial activities
with certain specified exceptions. 101" Whether these
exceptions were ever intended to restrict US jurisdiction
has been doubted. 101 Generally, the Act will not apply to:
"conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import
trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless ...
1. such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect ...
(a) on trade or commerce which is not trade or
commerce with foreign nations, or import trade or
import commerce with foreign nations; or
(b) on export trade or export commerce with foreign
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or
commerce in the United States; and
1. such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions
of this Act, other than this section.
If this Act applies to such conduct only because of
the operation of paragraph (1) (B) , then this Act shall
apply to such conduct only for injury to export
business in the United States." 10 "
99
See, James McNeill, supra, note 2 at 445. See also, Dean Brockbank, supra, note 97 at 17. ("The act
makes it clear that the United States antitrust law are intended to protect United States consumers and the
American economy from trade restraints, and not foreign consumers or foreign interests.")
See, Dean Brockbank, supra, note 97.
Id. ("with such broad exceptions, the general denial ofjurisdiction is practically meaningless.")
102
15 U.S.C.s 6(a) (1988)
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In sum, the Act denies the application of US antitrust
laws to any foreign or domestic activities that affect
foreign consumers, producers, or markets unless there is a
"direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
domestic market or on United States exports opportunities.
The main achievement of the act, apart from bringing
export protection within the purview of the Sherman Act, is
that it "exempt [s] from United States antitrust law conduct
that lacks the requisite domestic effect, even where such
conduct originates in the United States or involves
American-owned entities operating abroad." 103 Since this was
more or less the stance of most courts even before its
enactment, the Act's contribution towards clarifying
jurisdictional rationales is evidently minimal.
Thus, current judicial tests remained in full effect
despite the Act. 104 In McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 105
the plaintiff, a US businessman brought antitrust action
against the defendant for refusal to deal occasioned by
defendant's breach of a contract entered into between the
parties for the buying and selling of chemical products in
Southeast Asia. The court held that the plaintiff failed to
satisfy the "direct, substantial, and reasonably
103
104
McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 814 (9
th
Cir.1988)
See, McNeill supra, note 2 at 446.
845 F.2d 802, 814 (9
th
Cir.1988)
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foreseeable effect" requirement of the Act, in that he
could not show that such effect on domestic commerce of
import trade or on export trade or commerce actually
occurred. 106 Many cases decided after the Act followed this
trend, denying jurisdiction in extraterritorial cases where
requisite effects in relevant US market are not shown. 107
b. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act
1994
While the FTAIA responded to and attempted to clarify
the jurisdictional uncertainties occasioned by differing
and conflicting rationales applied by several circuits to
determine extraterritorial jurisdiction, the International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act (hereinafter IAEAA)
was a congressional response to the hardship posed to US
antitrust enforcers in their international antitrust
enforcements because of foreign blocking statutes. 108 The
DOJ and the FTC experienced difficulties in obtaining
crucial information located abroad or in securing
,w>
Id.
107
See, e.g., Eunm-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer. Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ( court dismissed the
case on grounds that defendant's conducts did not affect US commerce); McElderry v. Cathy Pac. Airways
Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y 1988) (Plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of the FTAIA of
"direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" in US market and the court held that the case will
fail even if there was anticompetitive conduct in the United States).
10
See, James Mcneill supra, note 2 at 446.
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testimonies from foreign witnesses, required for the
prosecution of antitrust defendants in the United States. 109
The Act was enacted to facilitate the procurement of
these valuable data located abroad in order to ease
international antitrust prosecution. The IAEAA's synopsis
states: "An act to facilitate obtaining foreign located
antitrust evidence by authorizing the Attorney General of
the United States and the Federal Trade Commission to
provide, in accordance with mutual assistance agreements,
antitrust evidence to foreign antitrust authorities on a
reciprocal basis; and for other purposes." 110 Thus, the
Attorney General and the FTC has the power to enter into
binding, bilateral agreements with foreign countries to
provide for the exchange of discovery evidence in antitrust
actions. Different variants of the sort of agreements
contemplated by the Act had already been experimented with
Canada, Germany and Australia. 111 An agreement focused
specifically on access to and exchange of discovery
See, Daniel A. Austin, International Enforcement in the Clinton Administration, 88 Am. Soc'y Int'l L.
Proc. 89 at 98-102 (Remarks by Diane P. Wood)
no
in
10
Act of July 19, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-438, 108 Stat. 4597 (1994).
See, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and
Canada as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National
Antitrust Laws, reprinted in 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 156, at 560 (Mar. 15, 1984);
Canada-United States: Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, 24 I.L.M.
1092; Agreement between the Government of United States of America and the Government of Australia
Relating to Cooperation of Antitrust Matters, reprinted in 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1071,
at 36 (July 1, 1982).
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materials already exists between USA and Canada. 112 US
antitrust enforcers relied on this agreement to obtain
confidential information that resulted in the successful
prosecution of Kanzaki Specialty Papers, Inc., a Japanese
corporation, for antitrust violations. 113
Unlike others before it, agreements contemplated under
the IAEAA are based on the principle of cooperative
reciprocity. In return for information received by the US
Attorney General from foreign antitrust authorities, the
Act requires that foreign countries are entitled to receive
similar assistance in the United States upon request. 114
Thus, the Attorney General would use its elaborate legal
powers to secure information located within the United
States for use abroad in the prosecution of US citizens or
US based corporations, for the violation of alien
competition laws. 115
It is not clear whether the Attorney General should
first satisfy himself that the anticompetitive act against
which prosecutorial information is required was actually
" See the Agreement between the US/Canada, supra.
J
See, Tokyo Fax Paper Firms Settle Division Price Fixing Charges, 69 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1732 at 399 (Oct. 5, 1995). The relationship between Canada and the United States in the
antitrust field is special. First, they share similar notions of antitrust law enforcement. Second, their MLAT,
a criminal law enforcement treaty, contain provisions specifically permitting enforcement cooperation in
antitrust. Besides, the fact these companies were Japanese and not Canadian made for easy coordinated
enforcement without the usual difficulties caused by national interests concerns. See, the discussion of the
agreement between the US/EU in Part III, infra.
""'See. IAEAA, supra.
115
Id.
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committed or whether such act would constitute a violation
under US laws or whether the basis for determining foreign
anticompetitiveness involves threshold jurisdictional
inquiries similar to our "effects" or Timberlane I
doctrines. Barring these unresolved ambiguities, it appears
that information exchange agreement under the IAEAA scheme
could result in successfully coordinated enforcement since
parties actually agree under a binding legal instrument.
But lack of any enforcing mechanism, among other factors,
could hamper both its implementation and chances of
attracting foreign signatories. Only one agreement has been
negotiated and signed under the statute in five years of
its existence. 116
As the Act did not purport a jurisdictional dimension,
it is not surprising that nothing therein addresses the
issue of when the courts may exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction over foreign antitrust violations. This
deliberate neglect is probably congress' way of leaving the
jurisdictional determination still to the courts. 117
However, by granting extensive powers to FTC to institute
antitrust discoveries abroad without first requiring a
determination of jurisdiction by a competent court, the act
6
See, the agreement between the United States and Australia.
In view of the conflicting decisions by the courts the courts in this area, it would have been most
desirable for Congress to take the opportunity to clearly specify jurisdictional parameters.
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has the potential to "fuel the furor over extraterritorial
assertions of Sherman Act jurisdiction" 118 because it is
appears to permit the agencies to bypass judicial threshold
jurisdictional inquiry.
Prior to the Act, only courts of competent
jurisdiction could issue orders for discovery production.
Usually, this would happen following the filing of a
complaint and after balancing the considerations in a
threshold of jurisdictional inquiry. 119 Under the Act, such
production order may be issued merely on the application of
an antitrust authority, in compliance with a bilateral
exchange agreement. 120 One commentator lamented on this
obvious loophole in the Act asking a set of unanswerable
questions
:
[W] ho makes the threshold determination of
prescriptive jurisdiction, the antitrust authorities or the
courts? If it is the antitrust authorities, are they
qualified to make that determination? What standards will
guide their inquiry? More importantly, when United States
antitrust authorities apply to their foreign counterparts
for discovery production, will the Sherman Act be the basis
of jurisdiction for a foreign court order? If so, are the
foreign authorities and courts competent to make a
jurisdictional inquiry under the Sherman Act? What will be
the governing test in their jurisdictional analysis, the
effects tests or the Timberlane test? 121
118
See, John Chung, supra, note 83 at 405.
119
Id. at 406
120
Id.
121
Id.
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By this Act, Congress may have succeeded in designing
the best legislation in procuring discoveries of
evidentially viable documents abroad. However, its
workability in boosting international prosecution of US
antitrust violations would depend on the number of
countries that actually execute the cooperative enforcement
agreement. The fact that only one country has signed up in
nearly five years of its enactment may not necessarily
justify an assumption that the Act will fail, but it's a
good indication that there is something unsatisfactory
about the Act. For one, its lack of popularity amongst US
trading partners is apparent. Furthermore, by avoiding
jurisdictional issues, the Act has failed to avert the
threat of blocking statutes. Countries dissatisfied with
the application of US antitrust law within their domain may
still enact or invoke blocking statutes to resist the
Sherman Act if no clearer standards of jurisdictional
determinations are provided. 122
However, there is succor in the fact that section
6207(a) (3) of IAEAA requires as a precondition to utilizing
the agreement, that enforcement authorities should "[take]
into consideration, among other factors, whether the
foreign states or regional economic integration
" See International Reactions and Counter-Measures, Supra.
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organization represented by the foreign antitrust authority
holds any proprietary interest that could benefit or
otherwise be affected by such investigation, by the
granting of such order, or by the provision of such
antitrust evidence." 123 This modest deference to
international interests is commendable, but in an area
where the courts have failed miserably in the past, it is
doubtful if the antitrust authorities would not fall into
the same difficulties. Thus, an order for discovery
production could be made by antitrust agencies without
sufficiently considering international concerns or in
ignorance of foreign interests. 124
REGULATORY GUIDELINES
The antitrust enforcement agencies, the DOJ and FTC,
since 1977, have issued periodic guidelines on their
enforcement policies regarding international businesses. 125
These are called the Antitrust Guidelines on International
Operations. 126 Generally, the guidelines are comprised of
detailed statements of applicable antitrust laws and
illustrative analysis of hypothetical instances when
enforcement would be pursued by the agencies. They are non-
123 15U.S.C.S. s6207(a)(3).
" 4
Note that the Act does not require judicial inquiry into the reasons for requesting discovery orders.
125
There are three such Guidelines to date; 1977, 1988 and 1995.
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binding in nature, do not apply to private, state or
foreign antitrust actions and are not meant to reflect
enforcement positions of other antitrust agencies like the
International Trade Commission. 127
The 1977 Antitrust Guide for International Operations
was "intended to help businesses plan transactions which
the Department of Justice is not likely to challenge and to
determine which transactions are likely to require detailed
factual inquiry by the enforcement agencies." 128 In 1988,
the Guidelines purpose remained unchanged. x29 Both documents
stated that US antitrust laws would be applied to overseas
transactions when there is a "substantial and foreseeable
effect" on United States commerce. However, the 1995
version 131" took an aggressive and hostile pro-enforcement
stance against foreign antitrust violations.
One commentator noted that the 1995 guidelines "appear
to be more of a warning than a guide ... a warning to foreign
governments and enterprises that the agencies intend to
b
The 1977 version was referred to as Guide.
See, Robert G. Shimp, supra, note 98 at 289.
128
See, ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (Jan. 26, 1977), reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Vol.
50, NO. 799, at E-l (Feb. 1, 1977).
129
See, ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (Nov. 10, 1988), reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Vol.
54, NO. 1391, at S-l (Nov. 17, 1988).
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations, reprinted in Joseph P. Griffin, US International Antitrust Enforcement: A
Practical Guide to the Justice Department Guidelines, 53 Corp. Prac. Ser. (BNA) at B-181, B-193, s 3.34
(Apr. 5, 1995)
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actively pursue restraints on trade occurring abroad that
adversely affect American markets or damage American
exporting opportunities." 131 Diane Wood, then Deputy
Assistant Attorney General DOJ Antitrust Division, stated
the three fundamental principles upon which the 1995
Guidelines are based: 1. Agencies' commitment to enforce
antitrust laws to the "fullest extent;" 2. the agencies'
determination "not [to] discriminate on the ground of
nationality of parties nor on the location of relevant
events;" and finally, 3. the agencies commitment to the
principles of international comity. 132
The changing emphases of the guidelines are merely
reflective of the state of the law at the different times.
The 1977 and 1988 guidelines utilized jurisdictional
parameters enunciated by the courts and the legislature at
the time. Though the 1988 version mirrored the FTAIA of
1982 and the Export Trading Act by including export
protection within its purview, the agencies exhibited self-
restraint in terms of subject matter jurisdiction in
stating that it would only challenge foreign
anticompetitive conduct that directly harmed United States
See, Dean Brockbank, supra, note 120 at 21.
" See, Diane P. Wood, The 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations: An
introduction. Address Before the American Bar Association Antitrust Section, (Apr.5, 1995), available in
WESTLAW, 1995 WL 150745 (D.O.J), cited in Dean Brockbank supra, note 97.
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consumers. 133 However, this self-imposed jurisdictional
constraint was discarded in 1992 as an effort to satisfy
the intent of congress in enacting the FTAIA. The all-
embracing stance of the current 1995 guideline should
therefore be understood as an aftermath of the all-
embracing Hartford Fire Insurance decision in 1993, which
failed to place any meaningful limit on the reach of the
Sherman Act abroad. 134
The three guidelines contain a wide range of subjects
most of which do not merit detailed discussion here. For
our purpose however, it is important to see how the
agencies treated the issues of extraterritoriality and
comity in their international enforcement.
a. Extraterritoriality
Extraterritoriality refers to the extension of
antitrust jurisdiction to foreign parties and/or conduct
which have reprehensible consequences within the US
markets. There are two interlinked issues here, one is the
jurisdiction over the conduct (subject matter jurisdiction)
and the other is jurisdiction over the actors (personal
jurisdiction) . Both forms of jurisdictions are required for
effective prosecution of antitrust over foreign defendants.
The requirements for subject matter jurisdiction is
133
See, Foot Note 159 in the 1988 Guidelines.
38
satisfied once the agencies can prove that certain
anticompetitive conduct undertaken abroad have resulted in
a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect"
on United States commerce. Gaining personal jurisdiction,
on the other hand, is more troublesome. If a foreign
enterprise has a US subsidiary, the agencies can file a
suit against it as the "alter ego" of the foreign firm. To
cater for instances where corporate agents are lacking, US
law has devised a means of gaining personal jurisdiction
over defendants located abroad based on minimum contacts
with the United States. 135
Both the 1977 Guide and 1988 Guidelines adopted the
"substantial and foreseeable effect" test. With the
enactment of the FTAIA (1982) and the Export Trading
Company Act (1981) , the 1988 Guidelines extended its
coverage to export trade in order to reflect the intent of
those statutes, even though it practically restricted
enforcement to matters that directly harmed consumers as
opposed to exporters. On personal jurisdiction, both
documents contemplated utilizing subsidiary suits and the
minimum contact principles to satisfy personal
jurisdictional requirements. Specifically, the 1977 version
134
See, 509 U.S. 764(1993).
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asserted, "The general trend of modern history has been to
expand personal jurisdiction of our courts to reach those
who transact business in a certain place, even if they are
not found there in a traditional jurisdictional sense." The
1988 issue continued similarly.
However, the 1995 version wholeheartedly adopted
Hartford Fire Insurance on the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. Thus, if "(1) the conduct has a direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on exports of
goods or services from the United States, and (2) the US
courts can obtain jurisdiction over foreign persons or
corporations engaged in such conducts," then a US court has
subject matter jurisdiction. On personal jurisdiction, the
Guidelines require that the agencies bring action only if
they believe that personal jurisdiction exists under the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 136 The
Guidelines it confirms that personal jurisdiction could be
obtained in the US through agents or related corporations
of the foreign enterprise. 13 '
' This is called the "minimum contact" principle, whereby agents of foreign corporations in violation of
US antitrust laws could be arrested at anywhere in the United States and prosecuted for their violations. See
International Shoe case.
136 The 1994 International Antitrust Guidelines, supra, at 501.
137
Id.
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b. Comity
Both the 1977 and 1988 documents contained comity
considerations. However, the earlier version simply stated
that, "the laws of the nation with the more important
national interest at stake, based upon its own laws and
policies, should prevail" 138 and quickly added that US
antitrust laws represent "a fundamental and important
national policy," 139 giving the impression that hardly would
other national laws outweigh them. The 1988 version is more
straightforward in stating that the department has
"committed itself to consider the legitimate interests of
other nations." 140
However, the basic policy under both schemes was the
same in that the department before embarking on enforcement
actions considers interests of other nations. The 1988
version specifically states that, "in determining whether
it would be reasonable to assert jurisdiction or seek
particular remedies in a given case, the Department
considers whether significant interests of any foreign
sovereign would be affected and asserts jurisdiction only
when the Department concludes that it would be reasonable
138
the 1977 Guide, supra at S-15.
l39
Id. atE-15.
140
1988 Guidelines, supra, at S-22.
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to do so." 141 If the department feels that some foreign
interests would be harmed, it is supposed to decline
jurisdiction. Comity considerations were therefore viewed
as significant determinants for exercising jurisdiction.
Regarding comity, the 1995 Guidelines once again find
solace in Hartford Fire Insurance decision. Instead of
considering comity issues as part of the preconditions for
determining jurisdiction like the two previous versions,
the 1995 guidelines utilizes the effects test and Hartford
Insurance analysis to determine extraterritorial
jurisdiction for the Sherman Act. Like, the Supreme Court
in Hartford Fire Insurance case, comity is only considered
where there is a "true conflict of law." 142
141 1988 Guidelines, supra, at S-22 n.170.
142
1995 Guidelines, supre. at 157.
CHAPTER 3
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS (ICEAs)
Unlike the early 1900 's when law was regarded as
largely territorial in nature, the act of applying certain
national economic laws to external activities that have
domestic implications has been found expedient in today's
global economy; where events in one country have the
potency of generating world-wide effects. In fact,
countries nowadays that cannot enforce their economic
regulations - especially antitrust laws, outside their
borders may be hampered from effectively protecting
domestic markets from external anticompetitive conducts. As
seen in the preceding paragraphs, extending US antitrust
laws abroad has not been a very pleasant experience - at
least from the US perspective, due to resistance from
foreign states. 143 Further, efforts by the US courts,
Congress and the antitrust agencies to clarify
jurisdictional rationales and temper Sherman Act's wild
expansiveness by deferring to comity factors have failed to
See, Part II, supra, for the discussion on International Reactions and Counter-measures.
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produce consistent rules amongst the various circuits of US
Courts thereby leaving the field largely confusing. 144
Since global economic realities and the US strategic
position in global commerce make continued US
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act
inescapable, it would be wise for the United States to
invest in searching for a global framework that would
affect every nation since none exists to date.
PURPOSE OF ICEAS
It has never been an acknowledged purpose of US
antitrust agreements to limit extraterritoriality per se,
in relation to their foreign country parties. Rather the
purpose of interstate agreements on antitrust between the
US and other nations depends largely on the era in which
the agreement was made and the prevailing antitrust
policies at the time. In the early days, these agreements
were merely formulated to reduce jurisdictional conflicts
that arose because of US attempts to apply its antitrust
laws abroad. 145 That objective changed later and the DOJ
began to seek broader agreements geared towards actual
4
See. James Mcneill, supra, note 2.
1
The first two agreements between US and Canada, supra, were informal and meant mainly as conflict
mitigating devices. See also. Agreement relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business
Practices, (US-Federal Republic of Germany), June 23, 1976, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) P13.501.
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cross-border cooperation in antitrust matters. 146 As growth
in international trade and globalization heralded a period
marked by increased international businesses, concerns over
the role of competition in cross border trade increased.
So, also did the nature of and purpose of antitrust
agreements changed to reflect that awareness. Currently,
the United States view interstate agreements on antitrust
as instruments for mutual and reciprocal data gathering and
investigative assistance that is aimed at cross-border
antitrust enforcement. 147 Thus, contemporary agreements
focus more on trans -boundary information exchanges and
confidentiality protections than on jurisdictional conflict
resolution. 148 Because US trading partners are unwilling to
execute binding agreements on information exchange and
cooperation, most agreements concluded between the United
States and several countries within the past decade take
the form of loose commitments to cooperate without legal
obligation to do so. 149
6
See, the 1995 Agreement between the US and Canada, supra; and the 1991 Agreement between the US
and The European Communities, supra.
See, discussion of the IAEAA of 1994 in section III, infra. Under the Act bilateral agreements
contemplated under the IAEAA are aimed at facilitating reciprocal information exchanges during
extraterritorial antitrust investigation ancior prosecution.
148
Id.
See, for instance, bilateral cooperation agreement has been executed by the United States and Israel -
March 15, 1999, 1999 WL 152529 (D.O.J.); the European Communities - June 4, 1998, 1998 WL 289655
(F.T.C.); Japan - October 7, 1999, 1999 WL 802551 (D.O.J.); Brazil - October 26, 1999, 1999 WL 974344
(F.T.C). For text of each agreements see the DOJ web site at www.USDOJ.GOV (no period).
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HISTORY OF COOPERATION IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
Inter-state cooperation in the area of antitrust is
not a novel concept. As early as the 1950 's some
arrangement, though informal, existed between the United
States and Canada, 150 based on reciprocal notification and
consultation following antitrust investigation or
proceeding embarked upon by one that affected the other's
interests. 151 Known simply as the "Fulton-Rodgers
Understanding," the agreement emerged in the midst of
enforcement conflicts that arose between the two countries
under the Canadian Radio Patent cases. 152
In 1967, the OECD published a recommendation on
antitrust cooperation among its member states. 153 The
recommendation, which undergoes periodic revisions, 154
established notification and consultation mechanism which
is triggered whenever a member country investigates or
seeks information from another member country or takes
action against a person located in the territory of another
See, Charles S. Stark, International Cooperation in the Pursuit of Cartels, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 533 at
534(1998).
151
Id.
152
See, Id. See also, United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), modified, 1 15 F.
Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953); United States v. general Elec. Co., 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 70, 342 (S.D.N.Y
1962) (consent decree).
3j
See, Recommendations of the Council concerning Co-operation Between Member Countries on
Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(67)54/Final (Oct. 5, 1967).
4
For the latest revision, see, Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation Between
Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(95)130/final
(July 27 & 28, 1995), available in the 35 I.L.M 1314 (1996).
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member pursuant to antitrust enforcement
.
15: Around the same
period, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) adopted competition codes known as the
Restrictive Business Practices Code. 156 Unlike the OECD
recommendations, UNCTAD codes failed because the key bloc
had incompatible objectives during negotiations: 15, "While
the Western industrialized nations thought they were
seeking the establishment of real antitrust law, the less
developed nations wanted a set of rules about economic
development and the control of multinational
corporations..." 158 Thus, the effect of UNCTAD codes on the
development of cooperative mechanism was negligible. 159
In 1969, US and Canada confirmed, during more informal
talks that they would follow the provisions of the OECD
recommendations in their antitrust -related dealings. 160 This
resulted in the "Mitcheil-Basford Understanding." 161
The first formal antitrust agreement concluded by the
United States, which was directed at both cooperation and
antitrust enforcement, was the 1976 agreement between the
155
Id.
30
See, set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices, Apr. 22, 1980, UN Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980).
157
See, Spencer Weber Waller, supra, note 15 at 350.
' 5 '
Id
Id. Note, however, that as early as 1957, the EEC (as it was then called), made up of six European
Countries had executed already executed a Treaty on economic integration which contained rules on
competition law subject to supranational implementation and adjudication.
160
See, Charles Stark, supra, note 150 at 535.
161
Id.
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United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. 162 Apart
from this agreement with Germany, other agreements entered
into by the United States in the 1980' s were focused mainly
on lessening conflict over antitrust enforcement instead of
mutual or coordinated antitrust enforcement per se. 163 As
one commentator noted, "little of the focus on antitrust at
the international level was concentrated on enforcement
cooperation; to a far greater extent, international efforts
were aimed at avoiding conflicts of the kind that had
arisen with some frequency when one country took antitrust
action that another country viewed as adversely affecting
its interests." 164 In this category were the 1982 US-
Australia Agreement 165 and the 1984 US-Canada Agreement. 166
The first contemporary antitrust agreement that
combined both conflict resolution and cooperative
enforcement mechanisms was the 1991 agreement between the
United States and the European Communities. 167 This
b2
See, Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices,
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.(CCH) 13,501 (June 1976).
163
See, Charles Stark, Supra, note 150.
1M
Id.
'"See, Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Australia Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) <13,502
(June 29. 1982).
166 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
States of America as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of
National Antitrust Laws, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) < 13,503A (Mar.9, 1984).
16
See, the EU/US Agreement discussed in detail, infra.
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agreement was heralded as a "state-of-the-art" agreement 168
because of its elaborateness in providing for notification,
consultation, comity, and coordinated enforcement
actions. 169 Also, there were provisions on information
exchange and for tipping off the other party about
antitrust matters in which it might have an enforcement
interest. 170 These innovative provisions made the EU-US
agreement appear satisfactorily all embracing. As evidence
of its comprehensiveness, its provisions were adopted by
Congress, 171 and formed an integral part of a subsequent
antitrust related agreements. 17 " However, its effectiveness
became questionable in view of differing national laws and
policies regarding sharing of investigative information. 173
However, subsequent cooperation agreements executed by the
United States have taken the form of the 1991 EU/US
agreement. For instance, all the 1999 cooperation
agreements concluded by the United States with Israel,
Japan and Brazil share identical provisions. 174 Certain
factors influenced international antitrust cooperation from
this period on. As these factors were instrumental to
bi
See, Charles Stark, supra, note 150.
bV
See, the EU/US Agreement, infra.
,7u
Id.
The provisions of the 1994 International Antitrust Enforcement Agreement share many similarities with
the EU/US Agreement.
172
Notably, the 1994 International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act and the 1995 US-Canada
agreement, that revised the 1984 version, all contain provisions reminiscent of the US-EU model.
173
Id.
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bringing about the current status quo in cooperative
enforcement, they merit a discussion here.
i. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties ( "MLAT" ) are
generally intended to assist in cross-border criminal
investigations and prosecutions between the United States
and foreign country signatories. They are not antitrust-
specific agreements, rather they focus on general criminal
law enforcement and provide basically that the two
countries will share investigative information with one
another and will obtain on each other's behalf,
investigative information for use in a criminal
investigation or proceeding of the other country. In 1990,
the United States entered into a MLAT with Canada. 175 Since
certain antitrust violations are criminal in both
countries, US-Canada MLAT specifically mentioned antitrust
as one of the subject matters therein. 176
Since the early 1990' s, antitrust enforcers in both
countries utilized the treaty provisions to coordinate
antitrust enforcement by sharing investigative information
and undertaking seizures of documents located within each
borders to aid ongoing antitrust enforcement in both
1,4
For a text of these agreements, see the DOJ web site at http://www.usdoi.igov (no period).
75
See, Treaty with Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, S. Exec. Rep. No. 100-1 14
(1989).
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territories. 17. The facility provided by this kind of
powerful assistance to get evidence located across the
border was unprecedented and the impact was astounding. 176
Joint investigations under the treaty has resulted in many
prosecutions in both countries, a popular instance is the
price-fixing cartel that was foiled in the thermal fax
paper industry. 179 Notwithstanding the obvious fact that the
relative success with Canada owes mostly to certain
attributes shared by both countries' antitrust law and
enforcement, 180 the US authorities transplanted this MLA.T-
like idea into shaping the negotiations for future
antitrust cooperative enforcement agreements with other
countries. As further mark of confidence, the notion formed
the basis for a legislative proposal by the agencies to
Congress that culminated in the enactment of IAEAA in
1994 , 181
ii. Cooperation in non-antitrust areas
While antitrust enforcers were battling in the 1980'
s
to lay down acceptable standards for resolving
176
Id -
1
See, Charles Stark, supra, note 150.
Z Id -9
See, Tokyo Fax Paper Firms Settle Division Price Fixing Charges, 69 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1732 at 399 (Oct. 5, 1995) (where it was reported that in United States v. Kanzaki Specialty
Papers, Inc., cooperation between United States and Canada led to breakup of fax papers cartel).
180
Like the US, Canada criminalizes antitrust violations. See, supra on the factors which make
US/Canadian antitrust cooperation relatively easy in comparison with the rest of the world.
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jurisdictional disputes in international antitrust, their
counterparts in other economic law areas were already
reaping the benefits of inter-state cooperative mechanisms.
Thus, very elaborate agreements had already existed between
US enforcers in the securities, tax, and customs services
and their foreign counterparts for mutual and reciprocal
enforcement in the relevant areas of law. 182 These
agreements contained advanced information sharing and
investigative collaboration provisions far beyond the level
contemplated by the EU-US agreement. Antitrust enforcers
began to realize that if such cooperation was possible in
other economic spheres, it could be pursued in antitrust as
well. 183
iii. Antitrust convergence and international adoptions
Another positive influence on international antitrust
cooperative enforcement mechanism in the early 1990 's was
the significant convergence that had occurred globally in
the area of antitrust. 184 Most developed countries, around
1980' s, had some form of competition rules compatible with
181
The difficulties in securing MLAT-like agreements from other countries which would comprise antitrust
violations as well is due to the fact that no other country outside Canada criminalizes antitrust violations
like the United States.
182
See, Charles Stark, supra, note 150 at 538. ("While we were still hammering out arrangements designed
mainly to avoid jurisdictional disputes, our securities enforcers, our tax enforcers, and our customs
enforcers had entered into very powerful MLAT-like arrangements with their counterparts abroad,
leapfrogging what we were doing in antitrust area ... if this kind of thing was possible in other areas of
economic law enforcement, why isn't it possible in the antitrust field?")
183
Id.
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the OECD recommendations and developing countries, changing
their economic policies to more market oriented paths,
adopted competition law either voluntarily or as parr; of
economic pacts with their advanced counterparts
.
18E Thus,
most countries have outlawed cartels, price-fixing, market
allocation and other per se antitrust violations. 186
Consequently, "countries that had once viewed
"antitrust" and "extraterritoriality" as anathema began to
accept ... that a strictly territorial view was not a
realistic way of enforcing antitrust in a global economy ...
many of the countries that once castigated the US antitrust
enforcement as "extraterritorial" now accepted similar
jurisdictional principles. 18. They focused less on the
notion that one or another country had a right to assert
jurisdiction, and more on the question of how best to deal
with one another in an era of overlapping jurisdiction." 188
With this changing attitude, the authorities in the
United States should have realized that the time was ripe
for a multilaterally negotiated framework for antitrust.
4
Id. See also, Eleanor M. Fox. infra, to the effect that global convergence has occurred mainly in the area
of cartel, price-fixing and market allocation prohibitions.
85
See, Report of the Special Committee on International Antitrust of the ABA Antitrust Section ("Report
of the Special Committee") ch 2 (1991). See also, Eleanor M. Fox, The End ofAntitrust Isolationism: The
Vision ofOne World, 1992 U. Chi. Legal F. 221 (EU extended condition of competition and trade to the
countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and developing countries of Eastern European).
186
See, Eleanor Fox, supra.
8
' See, Charles Stark, supra note 150. Note also that in the European Union, though articles 85 and 85 of
the Treaty of Rome does not specifically provide for extraterritoriality, competition enforcement in the EU
is as extraterritorial today as the United States. See, the Wood Pulp Decision, infra.
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But the enforcing agencies in the US considered, instead,
that an initiative to systematize and expand the sharing
and collection of evidence between the US antitrust
authorities and their counterparts abroad, would be more
rewarding. 189 This resulted in a series of activities within
the justice department that led eventually to the proposal
of IAEAA to Congress. 190
iv. Perception of antitrust in international trade
"Antitrust isolationism," 191 the view that antitrust
law is separate from and contradictory in purpose to
international trade law significantly diminished in the
early 1990 's because of increased global competition. 192 The
integration of antitrust laws and trade rules have
generated concerns in the United States 193 as to how best to
implement both trade and competition policies in order to
augment US competitiveness in the global market. 194 Most
cross-border trade rules are currently administered within
,88
Id
189
Id.
190
Id '
191
See, Eleanor M. Fox, supra, note 185.
*~
Id. See also. Dean Brockbank, supra, note 97. (Originally, the purpose of the antitrust laws contradicted
the purpose of the international trade laws. That is, antitrust law was intended to protect competition, or the
consumer. [While] the trade regulations, specifically antidumping and countervailing duties, protect the
import-competing industries, at the expense of American consumers. [With developments in antitrust]
shifting the focus away from the consumer, the divergence between antitrust and international trade policy
seems to be narrowing).
193
See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, supra, note 16 at 393.
J4
See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Economic Commentary: US Must Update Its Merger Laws in this Time of
Foreign Competition, The Atlanta Journal - Constitution, Mar. 10, 1985, at K.4, cited by Thomas
Schoenbaum supra. (US Antitrust should be weakened to improve American international
competitiveness).
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the WTO, under a multilateral framework. 195 Submitting
competition law to such unified global mechanism would
result in the adoption of multilateral standards, which
would limit opportunities for acrimonious
extraterritoriality. The United States authorities instead
interpret the apparent linkages between competition law and
trade rules as warranting inter-country cooperation in the
area of antitrust. It is considered that countries would
view cooperation in antitrust matters as crucial as they do
those affecting trade per se. 19e In the face of the
potential for reciprocal extraterritoriality, cooperation
in forging common rules for enforcement appeared
attractive . 197
ICEAs UNDER IAEAA OF 19 94
The latest legislation relating to ICEAs in the United
States is the International Antitrust Enforcement
Assistance Act (hereinafter IAEAA or the Act) enacted in
5
The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations culrmnated in the adoption of General Agreement on :
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Trade in Services (GATS), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Law (TRIPS), Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) etc.
196
It is true that states, especially developed country members of OECD, welcomed international
discussion
and possible negotiation on the issue. However, most were more interested in a WTO-type arrangement
than the
bilaterally negotiated agreements considered by the United States. The European Union, for instance,
recommended that the WTO formulate rules on world competition in order to harmonize national policies
on
the matter.
19
See, Charles Stark, supra, note 150.
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1994. This Act emanated from a legislative proposal
submitted to Congress by antitrust enforcement agencies on
the nature of bilateral cooperation desirable in the area
of International Antitrust enforcement. 198 At a time when
the basis for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction by
US courts remained unsettled, it was surprisingly
disappointing that the Act left jurisdictional parameters
undetermined. 199 Instead, it focused on facilitating trans-
boundary investigations and information exchanges in order
to smoothen the process of extraterritorial enforcement of
antitrust
.
200
In that regard, the Act empowers US antitrust
enforcers to negotiate and conclude binding mutual
assistance agreements with their foreign counterparts in
order to provide for reciprocal exchange of discovery in
international antitrust actions. 201 The resulting agreement
would provide, under the principle of reciprocity, for
assurances of comparable assistance in exchanging
information, reimbursement of expenses incurred in
conducting investigations, descriptions of the laws and
198
Id.
199 IAEAA did not provide any helpful guidance on jurisdictional determinations in international antitrust.
It is merely an information exchange statute seeking to promote cross-border discoveries during antitrust
investigations.
200
See, International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of July 19, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-438, 108
Stat. 4597(1994).
201
Id.
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enforcement mechanisms of the United States and the foreign
state, confidentiality of antitrust evidence, and
termination of the agreement if confidentiality
requirements are violated. 202
However, the IAEAA agreement must preserve the right
of US antitrust agencies to refuse request for information
if such request is not consistent with United States public
interests. Where foreign information request is proper, the
agencies may disclose antitrust information within their
possession and/or use their legal authorities to
investigate and obtain evidence relating to a possible
violation of foreign antitrust laws in the United States. 203
Evidence obtained may be used to assist foreign antitrust
authorities "in determining whether a person has violated
or is about to violate any of the foreign antitrust laws
administered or enforced by the foreign authority, or in
enforcing any such foreign antitrust laws." 204
The Act drew on experience gained by antitrust
agencies through the implementation of similar information
gathering treaties that already existed between the United
202
See IAEAA § 12.
203
See IAEAA § 3(b).
204
Id.
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States and Germany, Australia, and Canada. 205 It also
attempted to clear legal impediments against US pretrial
discovery or investigation that had built up in practically
every nation trading with the US in the form of blocking
statutes. 206 To date -five years after its enactment, just
one IAEAA agreement has been successfully negotiated and
signed. 207
It was predicted that the Act would be unpopular with
many foreign nations since it offers no more than "a
fancier version of the same illusory promise to cooperate,
except when national interest dictates otherwise." 208 There
is a possibility that interstate cooperation in the
exchange of discovery of information could be enhanced, but
countries would have to sign the agreement first in order
to make this possible. The Act requires several provisions
in antitrust cooperative agreements which many states would
not consider being of significant benefit to them, or would
find uncomfortable to undertake. In addition, the Act
unfortunately preserved, if not further compromised, the
still unsatisfactory status quo ante on antitrust
05
See, Cooperative Antitrust Agreement between Canada - United States, supra; MLAT US - Canada,
supra; Cooperative Antitrust Agreement between United States and Australia, supra, and Cooperative
Antitrust Agreement between United States and Germany, supra.
06
See, discussion on International Reactions and Counter-Measures, Part II, supra.
07
See, United States - Australia Sign First IAEAA Agreement, April 26, 1999, BNA Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep, Int'l News, April 29, 1999.
08
See, Spencer Weber Waller, supra, note 10 at 1119 ("There is no reason to believe that the waiting line
under the IAEAA will be very long").
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extraterritoriality. 209 A host of other reasons exist why
the IAEAA has failed to generate the sort of response
expected by US authorities. Some of these are considered
below.
a. Nature of US Antitrust Enforcement
The IAEAA authorizes the Attorney General or FTC to
conduct investigations on behalf of foreign antitrust
authorities in order to obtain evidence relating to a
possible violation of foreign antitrust laws, regardless of
whether the conduct investigated violates any of the
federal antitrust laws. 210 Based on the principle of
reciprocity, 211 foreign antitrust authorities owe a
comparable duty to their US counterparts. Thus, it appears
that US antitrust agencies may be able to require that
similar investigation be conducted and evidence supplied by
foreign authorities on whether US antitrust laws have been
violated by anyone within their domain. However, full US
cooperation could be hampered by the narrow definition of
"foreign antitrust laws" in the Act.
According to IAEAA, foreign antitrust laws for which
US assistance is guaranteed are "laws of a foreign state,
or a regional economic integration organization, that are
19
The Act did not just leave the question of jurisdictional determination in limbo, but it also interjected
further uncertainties into that area in relation to the proper venue for determining jurisdiction under the act.
210
See, section 3(c) IAEAA, 1994, supra.
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substantially similar to any Federal antitrust laws and
that prohibit conduct similar to conduct prohibited under
the Federal antitrust laws." 212 Though relative convergence
has occurred in recent decades in substantive antitrust
globally, we are still decades away from full
harmonization. By offering such a restrictive definition to
foreign antitrust laws, the Act is overstating the level of
global substantive harmonization of antitrust and
constraining the measure of cooperation that US antitrust
agencies can provide to their foreign counterparts
following foreign request for information. 213 Considering
that the United States uniquely criminalizes antitrust
violations and provide treble damages to private
plaintiffs, it is difficult to imagine that any country,
apart from Canada, would have "substantially similar
antitrust laws" and prohibit similar conducts as those
available in the US.
Although legal authorities vary on the weight to be
placed on the definition section of a statute, the
:
" See, section 12(2) IAEAA, 1994, supra.
2i2
See, section 12(7), IAEAA, 1994, supra. Emphasis provided.
13
Since the US has been the main clog against the formation of international antitrust law, it is surprising
that IAEAA would assume that every nation would have antitrust laws that are "substantially" similar to
those enforced in the United States. In addition, the Act is exposing US agencies' request for information
to foreign scrutiny and possible denial. Since, the Act is based on reciprocity, its very easy for a foreign
antitrust authority to claim substantial disparity with US antitrust as ground for denial of cooperation. Only
few antitrust laws in the world are substantially similar to those of the United States. Even such similarity
exists, the manner in which the united States enforces its antitrust laws is hardly shared by the international
community. To date, only Canada treats antitrust violation as a crime.
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definition of "foreign antitrust laws" in such a narrow
fashion becomes more disconcerting when read along with
another limiting section of the Act. 214 Section 8(a) of
IAEAA authorizes US antitrust agencies to scrutinize
foreign request for investigative information and render
assistance only after a satisfactory determination that the
request is "consistent with the public interests of the
United States." 215 Countries whose antitrust differ markedly
from those of the United States - and there are many of
them - would not feel comfortable with these provisions
which tend to render the reciprocal assistance promised by
the Act illusory.
There is also the question of enforcement. Although
most countries that have antitrust laws seem to accept the
concept of extraterritoriality, there have been very few
cases of actual extraterritorial enforcement by countries
outside the US, except the EU and Canada. Doubting that
countries would be compelled to sign up for IAEAA mutual
assistance agreements, one commentator averred that "[F]ew
countries have a sufficiently aggressive extraterritorial
enforcement program to receive benefits from such a
commitment. Only the EU has any significant historical
commitment to investigating the anticompetitive conducts of
214
See, section 8(a) IAEAA, 1994, supra.
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US firms within US territory." 216 Besides, the commentator
continues, "most countries have considerable access to
evidence within the United States through letters rogatory
and letters of request that are not currently contingent on
reciprocity on the part of the requesting nation." 217
b. Jurisdictional Confusion
It was expected that Congress would seize the
opportunity presented by the Act to finally settle the
jurisdictional malaise that plagued US antitrust
extraterritoriality. 21S
However, not only did Congress overlook the opportunity by
excluding jurisdictional determinations from the Act, it
further exacerbated the issue by introducing more
jurisdictional dilemma. 219 Before the Act, orders for
foreign discoveries were issued by courts of competent
jurisdiction after the enforcement agency has filed a
complaint to that effect and the courts had the opportunity
;
l5
Id.
" See, Spencer Waller, supra, note 10 at 1119.
;
r
Id.
18
See, John Chung, supra, note 83 at 404. Note that previous attempt by Congress to clarify Sherman's
Act extraterritorial jurisdiction through the FTAIA did not settle the confusion because it expressly left
jurisdictional determinations to the courts who at the time were still battling to resolve contradictory
interpretations of the "effects doctrine," Timberlane, and Mannington Mills. When the Supreme Court
waded into the issue in Hartford Insurance, it compounded the jurisdictional issue further.
2lMd.
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to balance the considerations in a threshold jurisdictional
220inquiry.
The IAEAA obviates the necessity of judicial
determination by directly authorizing the Attorney General
to request discovery materials from foreign states without
a court order. 221 This procedural alteration further
obscures the jurisdictional question by making it unclear
as to whether the enforcement authority or the court is
making the jurisdictional determination. 222 With the
confounding inconsistencies already existing in the courts
over the Sherman Act's extraterritorial jurisdiction, a
source of international loss of faith in US antitrust laws,
this latest IAEAA contribution makes international reliance
on US antitrust extremely difficult. Why countries would
commit to reciprocal arrangement with the United States
under such unsettling climate is hard to see.
c. Confidentiality
A major obstacle to inter-country information sharing
is the existence in many countries of national
confidentiality laws and statutes that prevent antitrust
agencies from releasing confidential information. From a
business viewpoint, information exchanges between countries
220
Id.
221
See, section 6203, 15 U.S.C. (IAEAA).
22
See, John Chung, supra, note 83 at 406.
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pose serious threat to the preservation of corporate
secrets and business development schemes from competitors.
Business groups have been adamantly opposed to the free
flow of corporate information among state agencies. In a
statement issued by the International Chamber of Commerce
following the signing of the IAEAA, it claimed that
cooperation in antitrust enforcement would "endanger the
confidentiality of corporate information." From the
viewpoint of the state, mishandling sensitive business
information could have a ripple effect on the securities
market, destabilize business restructuring and harm the
economy. In addition, competition authorities keenly
protect the confidentiality of business information
obtained from corporations in order to preserve the
incentive for companies to volunteer information.
The Act made elaborate provisions on the treatment of
confidential information. 223 Section 12(2) (B) sets out what
confidential safeguards must contain in antitrust
cooperative agreement by requiring that; a mutual
assistance agreement must include assurances that the
foreign antitrust authority is subject to laws and
procedures that are adequate to maintain confidentiality
223
See, IAEAA, Section 12(2), 15 U.S.C. (1994).
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and grant adequate protection to antitrust evidence. 2 ^ 4 In
addition, section 8 (a) provides that for every request of
confidential information, the agencies must first determine
whether the foreign antitrust authority is capable of
complying with confidentiality requirements. While every
Hard-Scott-Rodino premerger information is prohibited from
disclosure by section 8 (b) of the IAEAA, evidence obtained
in accordance with an agreement is exempt from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act. 225
Finally, under the Act, dissemination of information
obtained under an agreement cannot be made to other
enforcement agencies except the FTC or DOJ. Above all, the
agencies are authorized to terminate agreements whenever it
is determined that confidentiality requirements by states
have been violated. 226
The foregoing confidentiality requirements seem
appropriate to protect information shared in the course of
antitrust investigation. It also appears sufficient to
quell concerns of states over the risk of exposing
sensitive business information of their corporations
abroad. However, anxiety has been raised that though the
Act seems to have covered a lot of grounds in this area,
225
226
See, IAEAA, 1994.
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the nature of US liberal discovery rules 227 and litigious
enforcement style remain a grave source of concern to
foreign enterprises. 228
d. Reciprocity
The entire Act is rooted in reciprocity. Thus,
whatever discovery assistance the Attorney General or FTC
request and obtain from foreign antitrust authorities for
the investigation of US antitrust violations abroad, is
supposed to be equally available within the United States
to the foreign antitrust authority upon request. In
addition to the fact that possibilities for evading
reciprocal assistance exists in the Act, reciprocity as a
concept usually works most in situations where states
perceive mutual benefits. Though the need to enforce
national antitrust laws beyond state borders in today's
global economy is undeniably clear, only very few states
actually do so. Reciprocity, in this case, constitutes
little incentive to states to enter the IAEAA mutual
assistance arrangement with the United States. In addition,
See, Loraine L. Laudati & Todd J. Fnedbacher, Trading Secrets: The International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act, 16 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 478, at 480. (The authors claimed that the
confidentiality safeguards in section 8 of IAEAA is limited because, though the agencies are prohibited
from disclosing antitrust evidence received under an IAEAA agreement, such an agreement may not
prevent the disclosure of evidence to a defendant in an action for violation of federal laws if disclosure is
required by federal law. In support of their arguments, the authors cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b), which allows parties to obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, relevant to the subject
matter and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
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since reciprocity implies co-equality, it appears that
countries contemplated to sign the IAEAA agreement are
those with a level of development comparable to that of the
United States - OECD members for instance. Developing
countries do not appear to be within the purview of this
Act and may not sign up as they have very little, if
anything, to gain under the agreement in terms of
reciprocity.
TYPICAL ICEA
Within the past two and a half decades, the United
States has formalized ICEAs with at least six countries and
one international organization. 229 Instead of a
multilaterally negotiated agreement the United States has
supported these sorts of undertakings as a veritable means
of solving inter-state multi- jurisdictional conflicts;
enhancing cooperation amongst various antitrust enforcement
agencies and promoting inter-country exchange of
confidential information of investigative or prosecutorial
value. While most of the agreements show, in theory at
least, that these several concerns are addressed properly,
official handlings of past crisis indicate that the
" See, Geralyn Trujillo, supra, note 4 at 629. (The author contends that Japanese firms are not accustomed
to US-style discovery rules and litigious enforcement and as a result would find it unpalatable releasing
information for use by US antitrust agencies).
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agreements failed to prevent interstate conflicts. The
following section briefly sets out the salient provisions
of one of these agreements, the one between the European
Communities and the United States. Using two potentially
explosive extra jurisdictional merger cases, we shall see
that these provisions did not prove effective in resolving
jurisdictional crisis in those cases.
a. The EU/US Cooperative Enforcement Agreement
The European Union and the United States Cooperative
Enforcement Agreement 23 ' (hereinafter "the agreement"), has
the following main aspects:
i. Notification
Article 11(1) of the agreement provides that each party
will notify the other whenever it appears that its
enforcement activities may affect that other's "important
interests." Specifically, notification is required where:
the first party's enforcement activities are relevant to
the other's enforcement activities; where they involve
conduct carried out in significant part in the other's
territory; where they relate to a merger or acquisition
which involves a company that is a national of the other
q
These are Canada, Germany, Australia and the European Union. Others are Japan, Brazil and Israel.
30 Agreement Between the United States and Commission of the European Communities Regarding the
Application of Their Competition Laws, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991). Note that the US and the
European Communities executed a follow up agreement to the 1991 version on June 4, 1998, see, 1998 WL
289655 (F.T.C.). For text of the agreement, see, the DOJ web site at www.USDOJ.GOV (no period).
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Party; where they involve conduct "required, encouraged or
approved" by the other party; or where they involve
remedies that would require or prohibit conduct in the
other party's territory. 231
Where the US antitrust authorities file a complaint or
indictment, they are required to give the EC authorities
notice in advance. Such notification is equally due the US
authorities from the EC whenever the latter authorities
issue a statement of objections or participate in public
regulatory or judicial proceedings that do not arise from
its enforcement activities. 2 ' The purpose of advance
notifications is to allow one party's views to be taken
into account during reviews of anticompetitive conducts
undertaken by the other party's enforcement authorities. 233
ii. Information Sharing
Article III of the agreement requires each party to provide
the other with significant information it receives about
anticompetitive activities in the other's territory and to
respond to requests for information relevant to enforcement
activity being considered or conducted by the requesting
party. However, neither party is obliged to provide
information if the disclosure of such information is either
231 The EU/US Agreement, Art. 11(1).
232
Id. Art. 11(4) & (5).
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prohibited by its laws or is incompatible with its
"important interests." 234 These restrictions
notwithstanding, it has been stated that enforcement
authorities could share a good deal of useful
information. 235 However, corporations involved in an
investigation may be required to waive the applicability of
confidentiality laws in order to hasten the
investigations . 236
iii. Coordination of Enforcement Activities
Under article IV of the agreement, each party agrees to
assist the other and to coordinate their enforcement
activities within resources reasonably available to it.
This obligation is subject to the need by parties to
protect its own "important interest." 237 In a Press Release,
the then EC Competition Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan
explained that: This provision is sufficiently flexible to
allow parties to coordinate their actions by one party
See, Joseph P. Griffin, EC/US Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Impact On Transnational Business, 24
Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1051 at 1056-57 (1993).
234
See, the Agreement, supra, Art. VIII. In the United States, laws that restrict the ability of US
government to share certain information are: (1) laws that protect information obtained pursuant to the
filing requirements of Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notifications; (2) laws that protect information
obtained pursuant to a Civil Investigative Demand or other compulsory process; (3) laws that restrict the
disclosure of grand jury materials; (4) laws that restrict the disclosure of confidential business information;
(5) exemptions from the Freedom of Information Act related to properly classified information obtained
from foreign governments and records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes. Note that
the EC also has similar laws restricting disclosure of information obtained in investigations and
notifications under the EC Merger Regulations. See, Art. 17(2), Council Reg. No. 4064/89.
'' See, Joseph Griffin, Supra, note 233 at 1059.
36
Id. Microsoft waived US confidentiality laws during the investigation of its licensing practice conducted
by both parties in 1994.
23
See, the Agreement, Supra, Art. IV.
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assuming the lead responsibility for a specific enforcement
activity of common interest to both parties. Through this
procedure, the parties would coordinate their investigative
efforts so as to gain the maximum benefits of their
respective enforcement powers, and avoid duplication of
efforts. 238
iv. Positive Comity
If one party believes that its important interests are
being adversely affected by anticompetitive activities
occurring in the territory of the other party that violate
that party's competition laws, the agreement provides that
the affected party may request that the other party
initiate enforcement activities. 2 However, the party
receiving such a request is not under any obligation to
initiate enforcement proceedings. 240 Neither is the
requesting party precluded from undertaking its own
enforcement activities. 241 These provisions have been
referred to as reflecting "positive comity" in order to
distinguish it from the traditional notion of comity that
s
The EC Commission and US Government Sign Antitrust Agreement, European Community Press
Release (Sept. 23, 1991).
239
The Agreement, supra, art. V(2).
240
Id. Art. V(4).
241
Id.
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involves concepts of moderation and restraint in
enforcement
.
242
The Agreement also contains provisions reflecting
traditional comity notions. 243 Article VI provides that
parties should "take into account the important interests
of the other party," during its investigation and
enforcement proceedings. 244
Enforcement authorities on both sides have hailed the
positive comity provisions in the agreement as an
unprecedented mechanism that would resolve jurisdictional
crisis in cross-border antitrust enforcements because:
either the US or the EC could ask the other party'
s
authorities to proceed under foreign law against any
potential or actual anticompetitive activity which could
harm the requesting party's interests. 245 We shall see,
shortly, whether this has proved true in practice.
v. Avoidance of Conflicts
The agreement requires the parties to take account of the
other party's important interests at all stages of its
enforcement activities. 246 According to the agreement,
242
See, Joseph Griffin, supra, note 233 at 1060.
243
The agreement, supra, art. VI.
244
See, Part II on Judicial Restraints, supra. Note that the need to balance conflicting interests of states in
extraterritorial antitrust litigation gave rise to the so called "comity considerations" adopted by courts in the
United States.
245
See, James F. Rill, US, EC Commission Forge Antitrust Cooperation Accord, 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 375 (Sept. 26, 1991).
246
The agreement, supra, art. VI.
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official involvement in a particular investigation or
conduct is not necessarily determinative of that party's
interests in the matter. Rather, "such interests would
normally be reflected in antecedent laws, decisions or
statements of policy by its competent authorities." 247 The
agreement stipulates six factors that need to be considered
along with other relevant factors in evaluating the
proposed enforcement activities, namely:
a. the relative significance to the
anticompetitive activities involved of
conduct within the enforcing party's
territory as compared to conduct within the
other' s territory;
b. the presence or absence of a purpose on the
part of those engaged in the anticompetitive
activities to affect consumers, suppliers,
or competitors within the other party's
territory;
c. the relative significance of the effects of
the anticompetitive activities on the
enforcing party' s interests as compared to
the effects on the other party's interests;
d. the existence or absence of reasonable
expectations that would be furthered or
defeated by the enforcement activities;
e. the degree of conflict or consistency
between the enforcement activities and the
other party's laws or articulated economic
policies; and
f. the extent to which enforcement activities
of the other party with respect to the same
persons, including judgments or undertakings
resulting from such activities, may be
affected. 248
247
Id. art. VI( 1 ).
248
Id. Art. VI(3).
73
Among the weaknesses of the EU/US cooperative
agreement highlighted above, the gravest is probably the
fact that each party is allowed full discretion in deciding
whether or not to take any enforcement action, either under
positive comity, 249 when the party has been requested to do
so, or under the coordination and comity provisions of
Article VI. 250 As a result of this lapse, the EU/US
agreement is incapable of effectively enhancing cooperative
enforcement between both parties, as the following cases
will show.
INSTANCES OF FAILED ICEAs
i. Ciba-Geigy & Sandoz Merger in Europe
Two European pharmaceutical companies, Sandoz and
Ciba-Geigy announced in March 1996 that they planned to
merge and form a new entity, Novartis. 251 The EU competition
authority expressed concerns that the merger would create
the second largest pharmaceutical company in the world with
a great tendency to lessen competition and restrain trade
in certain areas of their operations within the European
common market. Major areas of concern were crop protection
and animal health, where activities of both entities
249
Id. Art. V.
250
Id. Art. VI.
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overlapped. The commission feared particularly that their
combined research and development activities in those areas
would "far exceed all other competitors."
Thus, the EU authorities objected to the merger and
required that rigorous amendments be effected on the scheme
to address those concerns, as a precondition for clearance.
After series of meetings between the parties and the
commission, certain modifications were agreed upon. A major
condition was that the entities should grant non-exclusive
licenses for an animal anti-parasite product. Upon
satisfying that condition, the commission cleared the
merger and expressed satisfaction that as the scheme stood
then, there was little likelihood of creating future market
dominance in any sector engaged by the entities.
According to the EU/US agreements, not only were the
authorities in Brussels supposed to take the interests of
the United States into account during its investigation, 252
the United States' antitrust agencies were also required to
have regard to EU authorities' findings in the case. 253 This
"who-goes- first" approach was contemplated by the agreement
as a means of promoting coordinated actions when both
parties are interested in pursuing the same
1
See, EU Clears CIBASandoz Deal After Licensing Move, The Reuter Eur. Community Rep., July 17,
1996, available in LEXIS, Eurcom library, Ecnevvs file.
252 The Agreement, supra, art. VI.
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investigation. 254 However, without any reference to actions
taken by the EU or the outcome of that investigation, the
US Federal Trade Commission descended hard on the merger.
According to the FTC, the merger would result in the
creation of the largest crop protection company in the
world and the second largest in seeds and animal health. 255
Thus, it feared that monopolization would occur, especially
in the gene therapy sector where both companies were major
players. 256 To allay these fears, the FTC required numerous
conditions, for instance, the licensing of certain gene
therapy patents and technology and the extensive
divestitures in the herbicide and pet flea-control market.
The divestiture of Sandoz's corn herbicide business to BASF
of Germany for $780 million was the biggest divestiture the
FTC has ever ordered. 25 The FTC also prohibited Novartis
from acquiring new patent rights for gene therapy products,
barred it from re-entering the US flea-control market for
six years and placed a ten year ban on further acquisitions
by Norvatis within the US market. 258
253
Id. An. IV.
54
See, Laura E. Keegan, The 1991 US/EU Competition Agreement: A Glimpse of the Future Through the
United States v. Microsoft Corp. Window, 2 J. Int'l Legal Stud. 149 (1996)
35
See, William Hall, Ciba, Sandoz in US Deal to Speed Merger, Financial Times, Aug. 29, 1996, at 1 1,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Fintme file.
56
See, FTC Settles Challenge to Merger of Ciba-Geigy, Sandoz, Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. Antitrust Rep.,
Mar./Apr. 1997, at 8, 9.
257
Id.
258
Id.
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Why it was impossible for the European Community to
perceive that the United States interests in the matter
required more extensive restructuring than those it ordered
or why the United States failed to trust that EU
recommendations would address its concerns, both indicate
that irrespective of the agreement, in most cases each
party would rather prefer independent investigations
instead of a coordinated approach even where their concerns
are similar. 259
ii. Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger in the United States
In the wake of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger, it
was apparent that both jurisdictions would investigate the
merger because of the size of the merging US corporations.
While the US investigation was proceeding, a high EU
competition official assured that the EU would coordinate
the analysis of the merger with the US and would "do
everything to come to identical views with American
authorities on objections to the deal and ... look into
possible remedies." 260
9
See, Brian Peck, supra, at 1 191-2. (In comparing the approvals of both the EU Commission and the
FTC, although they had similar concerns with regards to market share dominance in the same particular
sectors, the respective responses and conditions were quite different. Judging by the conditions and
requirements which the FTC imposed on Novartis, it gave little consideration to the analysis and evaluation
of the EU Commissions's approval.)
iU EU to Coordinate Boeing Analysis with US - Schaub, The Reuter Eur. Community Rep., June 5, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Ecnews file.
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Despite that pledge, the EU review of the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas merger fell into the same pattern as the
Ciba-Geigy Sandoz case. The FTC in this case granted
unconditional approval to the deal after purportedly
investigating the merger and concluding that it did not
pose restraint on competition in any relevant market. 261
However, the EU competition authorities rejected the FTC
claim, undertaking to conduct independent review of the
merger under the EU competition laws. 262 A long list of
concerns emanated from the EU action about the
anticompetitive effect that the merger would have on the
European aviation industry. Amongst them were contentions
that the merger would lessen competition in commercial
aircraft market, making it hard for Airbus Industrie (A
European aircraft manufacturer) to compete effectively. 263
It also noted that Boeing's exclusive twenty-year supplier
contracts with major US airlines would lock out sales to
these airlines by Airbus for twenty years. 264 To be
compatible with EU competition laws, several concessions
were ordered by the EU. 265 In order to avert the huge fine
261
See, Brian Peck, supra, at 1 192.
262
Id.
63
See, Merger Control: Boeing Working Towards Accommodation with European Commission, Eur.
Rep., July 12, 1997, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Ecnews File.
264
Id.
265
Id.
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that the EU could levy on Boeing, the following concessions
were granted:
1
.
Boeing agreed not to enforce the twenty year
exclusive clauses with America, Delta and
Continental Airlines and refrain from entering into
any similar agreements until 2007;
2. the civilian airliner division of McDonnell Douglas
was to remain a separate legal entity for ten years;
3. Boeing was to license out patents obtained from
McDonnell Douglas's government- funded military
contracts and cross-license blocking patents to
other airline manufacturers;
4 Boeing made a commitment not to leverage customer
service and support with existing McDonnell Douglas
customers in a way that would unfairly promote
Boeing aircraft, or abuse relationships with parts
suppliers that would force them away from their
relationships with other airline makers. 266
iii. Analysis of the Failure of the EU/US Agreement
The central goal of the US/EU agreement was to provide
coordination and agreement about which jurisdiction should
take the lead in investigating a particular matter, in a
way that each party would "conduct its enforcement
activities ... insofar as possible, consistently with the
enforcement objectives of the other party." 267 Following
those positive comity objectives, the European Union,
worried about the harmful effect of the Boeing McDonnell
Douglas merger on the business of Airbus in the United
States and other countries, could have requested that the
United States prevent or quash the merger under its
79
antitrust laws. 268 In the same vein, the FTC had the rights
under the agreements to request the EU authorities to
address its concerns over the Ciba/Sandoz merger. 269
Instead of those lines of actions which the agreement
clearly envisioned, the parties in each case made
independent findings resulting in much more substantial
conditions being placed on both mergers by one party
against the other, favoring their respective national
entities
.
Commenting on the disparity in the review by both
jurisdictions, a commentator asserted that, "In both the
Boeing and the Ciba/Sandoz mergers, the FTC and the EU
Commission's analyses were far apart in their respective
conclusions about ant i- competitive concerns. In the end,
the FTC found little concern about Boeing, a US company,
but major antitrust concerns about Ciba/Sandoz, European
companies. The EU Commission's concerns were directly
opposite, with little concern about Ciba/Sandoz and major
concerns about Boeing ... it appears that each antitrust
authority protected its own national interests. The wide
disparity between the findings of the FTC and EU Commission
in both merger cases also indicates a lack of cooperation
266
jd
' The Agreement, supra, art. IV, 1994.
268 w _
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with, or at least consultation with, the other party's
analysis of the proposed mergers' antitrust concerns." 2
The moral here is clear; as far as countries are able
to dodge responsibilities to cooperate, coordinate and
consult with one another in enforcing cross-border
antitrust, they would continue to do so in the absence of a
binding obligation and effective enforcement mechanism. 271
The EU/US agreement contains very desirable provisions but
lacks the teeth to keep both parties in check when national
interests considerations tend to over-ride bilateral
cooperative commitments as demonstrated by the Boeing and
Ciba/Sandoz mergers. The potential to favor national
entities over foreign firms by antitrust authorities are
too great to expect states to overlook. In fact, it is
inconceivable that countries would proceed against resident
firms for anticompetitive conduct alleged by foreigners
under alien laws occurring in and affecting foreign
territories . 272
Legal commentators have doubted that the positive
comity aspirations of the EU/US agreement would ever
;
69
Id.
20
See, Laura Keegan, supra, note 254 at 1 194.
1
Id. (Although the agreement calls for cooperation, coordination, and consultation in both enforcement
activities and avoiding conflicts, the inherent weakness of the agreement is that there is no binding
obligation on either party to comply with requests, or to take into consideration the other party's interests.)
272
See, James R. Atwood, Positive Comity - Is It Positive Step? 1992 FORDHARM CORP. L. INST. 79,
87 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1993)
materialize into an effective tool for cross-border
antitrust enforcement because, among other things, "It is
not realistic to expect one government to prosecute its
citizens solely for the benefit of another. It is no
accident that this has not happened in the past, and it is
unlikely to happen in the future. We should not expect the
principle of positive comity to impact dramatically on the
proposition that laws are written and enforced to protect
national interests." 273 There is doubt that any inter-
country agreements without a strong, independent enforcing
body can effectively secure cooperative enforcement in the
area of antitrust where national economic interests
predominate. 274 For that and other reasons highlighted
above, the EU/US agreement fails in this regard. 27 '
b. The 19 9 8 EU/US Agreement on "Positive Comity"
Since the 1991 EU/US agreement did not secure the
level of mutual cooperation and coordinated enforcement
envisaged by the parties, a supplementary agreement was
concluded and signed by the parties in June 1998
2
" Id -
274
Id. ("Although certainly the goals of the [US/EU] agreement are worthwhile to pursue, it does not have
the necessary enforcement to be effective in cases such as the Boeing merger, in which sensitive interests
of both parties are substantially affected.")
15 Note that in June 1998, the EU and the United States entered into yet another agreement on cooperative
enforcement on antitrust. This new agreement is directed specifically at the application of positive comity
principles contained in article V of the 1991 Agreement. It provides guidelines on the application of those
specifically on " the Application of Positive Comity
Principles." 276 Unlike the 1991 version, this new agreement
clearly specifies the circumstances under which both
parties will normally refer cases to each other. 2 Thus,
the agreement requires that one party defers or suspends
its enforcement activities directed at anticompetitive
activities occurring in the other party's territory where:
a) the foreign anticompetitive activities do not directly
harm the requesting party's consumers. 278 For instance a
cartel that limits export from the other party; b) the
foreign anticompetitive activities occur principally in and
are directed principally towards the other party's
territory, but incidentally harm the requesting party's
consumers. 2 For e.g., a production quota agreement in one
territory, affecting consumers in the other party's
territory. 28 ' In addition, the agreement stipulates that
information exchanged by competition authorities of the
parties can only be utilized for purposes consented to by
positive comity rules in the enforcement of their competition laws. As this agreement share the limitations
highlighted under the 1991 agreement, it merits only a brief discussion here.
'" See, Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the European
Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition
Laws, reported at the DOJ wed site at, www.usdoj.gov (no period).
277
Id. Article IV.
278
Id.
279
Id.
There is very little doubt that these provisions would result in better cooperation among the parties.
Even though the 1991 agreement contained sufficient provisions on coordination of enforcement activities,
it failed largely due to lack of enforcement mechanism and the tendency of parties to favor local entities
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the authority providing the information. 281 However,
secondary use of such information is possible where both
the providing authority and the entity concerned have both
given their consents accordingly. 282
Though the new agreement is said to reflect the
experiences gained by both parties through their
implementation of the 1991 agreement, 283 it failed - just
like the 1991 version, to provide for legally binding
enforcement mechanism to compel compliance by parties. 284
Moreover, the agreement does not apply to mergers. 285 Thus,
the sort of conflicts inspired by national interests of the
parties evident during the Ciba-Geigy - Sandoz and Boeing-
McDonnel Douglas mergers, discussed earlier, are not
necessarily averted by this later agreement. As a result,
it appears that the chance of this agreement ever
contributing towards coordinated antitrust enforcement
between the parties is at best minimal. It is regrettable
that despite the apparent incapacity of this type of
agreement to facilitate effective, conflict-free
against foreign-based corporation. Since this new agreement does not differ significantly from the earlier
version in these respects, similar difficulties could result.
281
See, Article V of the 1998 US/EU Agreement, supra.
282
Id.
283
Per FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky, quoted in 1998 WL 289655 (FTC).
"
4
Note, however that under the new agreement the party that chooses not to defer or suspend its
enforcement activities is required to inform the competition authorities of the party requesting deferral or
suspension of its reasons for not granting the request.
285
See, UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES SIGN AGREEMENT ON "POSITIVE
COMITY" IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1998 WL 289655 (F.T.C.) at 2.
84
cooperative and coordinated cross-border antitrust
enforcement, the US continues to pursue international
cooperation with agreements of this nature instead of
joining the global effort to fashion a world competition
regime. This year alone, three such agreements have been
signed with Israel, Japan and Brazil. 286
36
See, supra, note 149. That these agreements were concluded this year, after the unsatisfactory
experiences with the 1991 EU/US agreement, without any dramatic changes in contents and forms is
unfortunate. It is possible that the United States is developing this pattern of agreements as a means of
creating antitrust awareness amongst its trading partners with the hope of strengthening their internal
antitrust enforcement. But stronger supposition appears to be that the US is only interested in securing
cooperation from antitrust authorities in these countries in order to succeed in their quest to enforce the
Sherman Act around the globe. This is so because the former objective, if that's the US interest here -
which is doubtful, is achievable within the WTO under the ongoing process of internationalization.
CHAPTER 4
ANTITRUST EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY
Within the past decade, more than 40 developing and
transition economies have adopted competition law as an
element of market -oriented development strategy. 287 Around
May 1998, more than 60 WTO member countries had made
national submissions to the WTO Working Group on Trade and
Competition, attesting that there are specific practices by
enterprises that affect international trade such as price-
fixing, establishment of international cartels, market-
sharing, and monopolistic actions. 288 In the absence of an
international mechanism to address these practices at the
global level, member states fearing that the benefits of
WTO's trade liberalization efforts would be lost on their
national economies because of those private practices would
attempt to tackle these issues at the national level. 289
8
See, the Press Pact of the Second Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
Geneva, 18
th
and 20 th May, 1998; section on Interaction between Trade and Competition, reported in
http//:www.wto.org [Typically, these laws provide remedies to deal with a range of anticompetitive
practices including price fixing and other cartel arrangements, abuse of dominant position or
monopolization, mergers that stifle competition, and agreements between suppliers and distributors that
foreclose markets to new competitors].
Id. [Concerns were expressed that these practices reduce the benefits of WTO's trade liberalization
efforts.]
89 Of course, competition authorities of strong experienced countries like the US and the EU would revert
to the familiar route of extraterritoriality, while their weaker, less developed counterparts may once again,
resort to retaliatory legislation thereby re-enacting the whole ugly specter of strained diplomatic and trade
relations of old.
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Since customary international law recognizes the
rights of sovereigns to take action against external
activities that imperil their domains, 290 states would rely
on the European and American precedents to apply their
domestic competition legislation extraterritorially,
especially where EU or US corporations are involved. 291
Thus, there are no indications that the next Century would
see a lessening of extraterritoriality. On the contrary,
increasing internationalization of businesses 29 seems to
require maintaining a strong national antitrust regulation
capable of tackling both internal and external
restraints . 293
Inter-state cooperative agreements focusing on
monitoring and enforcing relevant economic laws could
reduce these cross-border anticompetitive conduct and
preserve trans -boundary trade flow among states. 294 However,
as the US experience shows, the need to protect national
90
See, Lotus Case, supra. These sovereign rights exist irrespective of specific extraterritorial provisions in
their antitrust laws. In fact, the European Communities Treaty articles 85 and 86 have no extra-
jurisdictional provisions, yet have formed the basis for extraterritorial applications of EU competition laws.
See, the Wood Pulp Case, supra.
*" Note that under the WTO rules, such international trade laws as antidumping could also catch certain
practices by external enterprises (especially foreign price discrimination or predatory pricing) enabling
states to take remedial actions under the WTO system.
9
" See, the OECD 1994 Competition Policy Workshop: Background Paper, reported in
http: www.oecd.oru. ''dafclp non-member_activities DNME 10.HTM at 8-9. ["national competition
authorities are increasingly confronting cases with international ramifications, while businesses are
increasingly finding their practices falling within several different jurisdictions."]
;
93
Id.
See, Joanna R. Shelton, Competition Policy: What Chancefor International Rules? OECD organized
Wilton Park Conference 545 on The Global Trade Agenda, 25 th November 1998, UK, reported in
http://www.0ecd.0rg//dafclp Speeches, JS-WILTO.htm at 8-1 1.
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interests and project national enterprises compromises
states' obligations under such cooperative arrangements. 295
This is compounded by the fact that these positive comity-
inspired agreements have failed to lay a satisfactory
framework for sharing confidential data by antitrust
agencies. 296 In fact, the efficacy of mere formal
cooperative agreements between states resulting in
cooperation among competition agencies has been doubted. 297
In most cases, these agreements fail because of differing
national competition laws and legal cultures. 298 The best
means of addressing increasing competition related issues
in cross-border trade relations without risking aggressive
extraterritoriality would be to fashion a scheme within the
world trading system. This sort of global outlook is not
93
See, generally Part III, infra, the discussion of EU/US Cooperative Agreement in particular.
The US International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act was specifically enacted to achieve
reciprocal sharing of confidential data by agencies, but certain provisions in the law make agreement by
states extremely difficult. See, Part III for the discussion of ICEAs under IAEAA, supra. See also, Joanna
Shelton, supra. [International cooperation among competition agencies is not something that depends only
or even primarily on formal instruments of cooperation. It is greatly fostered by countries having similar
laws and enforcement cultures.]
See, Joanna Shelton, supra, note 294. [Author notes that the only successful example of cooperative
agreement with confidential information sharing component is the one between Australia and New
Zealand. This is because most of the actions are undertaken under their closer economic relations treaty
(ANZCERTA) under which they adopted a free trade area and simultaneously replaced antidumpmg laws
with competition law provisions. The ANZCERTA arrangement allows both countries competition
agencies to hold hearings in either country, and to issue subpoenas and remedial orders enforceable in the
other country.]
98
Id. Note that the unique antitrust law enforcement culture of the US system is the greatest obstacle
hindering international cooperation. See, Part III, supra.
without history as attempts have been made in the past to
forge international standards on competition 299
a. International Attempts at Global Competition
The first international attempt to fashion global
competition rules occurred within the League of Nations. 300
Various trade experts were commissioned by the League to
evaluate the possibility of creating an international
system for the control of cartels. 301 However, the disparate
treatment of cartels by European nations, most of which
considered cartelization as positive tools for economic
progress, flawed this initiative. 302 Eventually, the League
could not muster sufficient majority to adopt any measures
against cartels. 303
The view of cartels and general attitudes towards
international trade changed dramatically after the Second
World War. 304 International activities geared towards
purging nationalistic distortions and impediments to free
flow of commerce across borders intensified. 305 As it is the
These attempts were made within the League of Nations, the United Nations, OECD, EU, NAFTA, EEA
(EFTA) and ANZCERTA, etc. See the discussion of the various arrangements in the following section.
M
See, Dale B. Furnish, A transnational Approach to Restrictive Business Practices, 4 Int'l Law. 317, 318-
22(1970).
301
Id.
302
Id.
03
See, Spencer Weber Waller, supra, note 15 at 350.
3U4
See, Diane P. Wood, supra, note 10 at 281.
Id. A the Draft Charter for an International Trade organization, known popularly as the Havana Charter
was prepared.
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situation currently, a system of fostering international
competition was considered imperative. 306 However, a Charter
for an International Trade Organization (ITO), which was
elaborately drafted to embody rules on "everything that
might distort the optimal world trading," 307 never saw the
light of day. 308
It is interesting however to note the striking
similarity between arguments made during negotiations for
competition rules under the ITO and those currently
advocating global competition. 30: For instance, it was
contended by Clair Wilcox, one of the architects of the
ITO, that:
The effort to expand trade by reducing tariffs and
eliminating quotas might well be defeated if no action were
taken to prevent the erection of private tariff and quota
systems by international cartels. The necessary action
might either through international agreement or left to the
initiative of individual states. But unilateral action,
even when taken by a government as powerful as that of the
United States, has its limitations ... it cannot obtain
306
dl
Id. The Charter contained rules on tariffs and trade (already accomplished by the GATT, which was to
form part of the ITO), international investment, competition, and dispute settlement etc.
18
The Charter was killed when the United States Congress refused to ratify it fearing usurpation of
authority in antitrust field. See, Spencer Waller, supra, note 15.
09
See, Daniel J. Gifford, supra, note 4. [Private exclusionary arrangements can potentially effectively
neutralize the market-opening efforts undertaken by governments.], see also, Diane P. Wood, supra.
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evidence concerning agreements made and administered
abroad, even where domestic producers do participate. And
if it does succeed in breaking up a cartel that is
sponsored or supported other governments, it may induce
those governments, in one way or another, to retaliate. If
action against restrictive business practices in
international trade is to be effective, it must be taken by
many states in accordance with a common understanding as to
^_n J
_, , 310policy.
Under the ITO Charter, a procedure was established
under which the ITO would receive complaints, conduct
investigations, and make findings regarding private
international restraint to trade. Each member was also
required to take all possible steps to assure that
enterprises in its jurisdiction do not engage in
restrictive business practices affecting international
trade which have harmful effects on production or trade and
interfere with the realization of any of the objectives of
the ITO Charter. Even though most of the countries that
agreed to the competition provisions of the Charter were
not themselves traditional competition laws countries,
their efforts were stalled by no other than the United
[International cartel agreements, by limiting competition, fixing prices, and curtailing trade, can nullify the
effects of reductions in governmental barriers to trade.]
310
See, Clair Wilcox, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 46-49 (MacMillan, 1949).
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States - who at the time were "the greatest publicists for
antitrust on the face of the globe." 311 The US position then
was not different from its opposition now. 312 Under the lame
excuse that: Congress was not ready to cede any antitrust
jurisdiction to the international mechanisms established by
the Charter, and further more, ... [after finding] the
language on restrictive business practices to be too weak,
as compared with prevailing US standards on these
matters; 313 the US Congress declined to ratify the Charter.
Following the failed attempt under the Havana Charter,
similar effort was made within the United Nations Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC)
.
314 Pursuant to ECOSOC
Resolution 375 of 1951, studies targeting anticompetitive
behaviors of enterprises was conducted by the council,
which culminated in the draft of a new set of rules on
restrictive business practices. The draft articles closely
resembled those adopted under Chapter V of the defunct
Havana Charter. 315 ECOSOC concluded its studies with a
release of the Committee's report which was made available
for general comments. Further discussion was rescheduled
311
See, Diane Wood, supra, note 155 at 283.
12
See, Spencer Waller, supra, note 10. [where the author claims that the US opposition to international
mechanism is fuelled by her fear that ceding turf to a majoritanan international system would deprive it of
antitrust powers and the ability to block actions by other states].
13
See, William Diebold, Jr., The End of the ITO (Essays in International Finance No. 16, Princeton U,
1952);
See, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Praqctices to the Economic and Social
Council, E/2380, E/AC.37/3 (March, 1953).
for 1955. 316 This did not occur because the United States
continued its disapproval of any kind of international
mechanism in the antitrust field. 317 The Eisenhower
Administration was credited with dealing the final blow on
the project by its vehement argument that the "the proposed
international agreement would be neither satisfactory nor
effective in accomplishing its purpose..." 318
Besides the 1960 GATT Resolution requiring Contracting
Parties to consult with one another on restrictive business
practices, 319 multilateral actions on international
competition ceased until the early 1970s when developing
countries' took the initiative within the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to push for
multilateral negotiations on restrictive business
practices. 3 ' This initiative resulted in the adoption by
the UN General Assembly of a "Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
315
Id.
3,6
Id.
'' See, Spencer Waller, supra, note 15. (The United States continued ambivalence towards both the
concept and specifics of international antitrust combined to defeat a newly version of the ITO competition
rules in the United Nations Economic and Social Council.)
318
See, Economic & Social Council, Restrictive Business Practices, Comments of Governements, E/2612.
Add 2, pp 4-5 (April 4, 1955) quoted in Diane Wood, supra, note 155 at 285.
319
See, GATT Resoultion, BISD 28 (9 th Supp, 1961).
The efforts of the developing countries was part of their attempt to establish a New International
Economic Order. Thus, they sought arrangements aimed at improving their economic developments as well
as control activities of Multinational Corporations. See, Spencer Waller, supra.
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Restrictive Business Practices" in 1980. 321 This UN Code on
Restrictive Business Practices failed because:
First, at the insistence of the developed countries, the
Code is voluntary. Second, at the insistence of the
developing countries, the Code contains numerous hortatory-
provisions calling for special attention, or special
concern, for the problems of the developing countries ...
However, because the code is non-binding, most countries
agreed that it did not originally constitute a source of
international antitrust law, nor has it evolved into such a
322source
.
Another form of international action worthy of mention
is the efforts undertaken by the OECD. In 1976, the
organization adopted a set of Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises on a wide range of subjects including
disclosure of information, competition, taxation,
employment and industrial relations, and science and
technology. 32 " Even though its rules are non-binding, the
OECD has contributed in no small measure towards achieving
international consensus on competition rules and has
321
See, UN Doc TD/RBP/CONF 10/Rev 1 (1980).
322
See, Diane Wood, supra at 286-7.
323
See, OECD Doc C(76) 99 (Final) (June 21, 1976), reprinted in 15 ILM 967.
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promoted better coordination of national policies amongst
its members. 324
Regional successes have also boosted the effort of
fashioning international rules of competition. 3 If any
legal system exists today which supports the view that
global competition rules are possible, it is the European
Union. 326 The EU "represents one instance where a group of
nations have successfully implemented an agreement to
create a supranational competition law regime, which takes
precedence over national law cases in conflict." 327 Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Union
have provisions similar to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, in prohibiting horizontal anticompetitive agreements
amongst competing firms, as well as monopolization or
market dominance. 328 Adherence to EU competition regulations
are guaranteed by a supranational legal system with the
j24
See, Diane Wood, Supra, note 10.
" 5 Almost every regional trade agreements now contain some form of competition rules. Popular amongst
them are the European Union, NAFTA, EFTA, ANZCERTA etc.
b
The EU is a custom union arrangement under which its members undertake to abide by centrally
formulated trade and competition regulations aimed at obliterating national barriers to free movement of
goods, persons, capital and services. It is a supranational structure akin to that existing between the Federal
Government of the United States and its component states. Just like states law in the US affecting
commerce would give way to federal regulation in cases of conflict, national regulations of EU member
states lose supremacy to EU regulation in similar field. For a more detailed legal analysis of the situation in
Europe, see, Mathijsen, EUROPEAN UNION LAW ; Note also that European countries are at the forefront
of the push for a WTO-based global competition rules. See,
'' Diane Wood, supra, note 10. [The story of the Community's success in creating its body of
supranational competition law rests primarily on the central role of competition law in the broader process
of market integration undertaken by the Member states].
"8
In addition, there is the EU Merger Regulation enacted in 1990 which grants the European Commission
wide ranging powers to review and approve business concentrations having "community dimensions," and
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European Court of Justice at the apex. Through uniform
interpretation of the treaty and relevant EU regulations on
competition, the Court has contributed in no small measure
to creating a single, Europe-wide competition standard
binding on all member states.
The EU has also succeeded in extending its competition
authorities to other countries around Europe either through
the so called Europe Agreement 3 ' or the European Free Trade
Area arrangement, in which signatory countries are required
to be bound by competition arrangements similar to those
operating in the Community. The United States failed to
seize a similar opportunity to achieve competition law
harmonization in the Northern American hemisphere during
NAFTA negotiations. 330 This spread of EU-type competition
rules to non-EU countries in Europe could lead to the
establishment of a European wide competition policy, making
eventual agreements on an international arrangement by all
European countries a breeze.
to prohibit any merger that might create or strengthen a dominant position within the Common Market.
See, Merger Regulation, Council Reg. 4064/89, 1990 OJ L257.
' 9 Europe Agreements are concluded between the EU and potential members of the Union. It is the very
first step towards accession. Currently, there are many Central and Eastern European Countries that have
signed this sort of agreement with the EU, e.g. Estonia, Poland, Hungary and Chek and Slovak Republics,
etc.
The United States was expected to play similar role in extending US-type competition law to members
of NAFTA. Though the resulting agreement contained specific provisions on competition, commitments by
members to any form of supranational harmonization did not occur. See, Spenser Waller, supra [that
NAFTA is characterized by the weakest forms of harmonization and ad hoc cooperation].
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As we saw in Part III of this work, bilateral
agreements have become increasingly popular in this are as
well. The limitations highlighted in the one existing
between the United States and the EU, for instance,
permeate almost all such agreements. 331 Unless a strong
enforcement authority exist to compel compliance with
obligations under the agreements, states would continue to
justify defiance on grounds of national economic interests
and the need to protect national enterprises. 332 The only
existing example of a successful bilateral agreement on
competition is the one between Australia and New Zealand. 333
This agreement is part of ANZCERTA, the free trade area
arrangement between both countries under which substantial
harmonization has occurred in various aspects of their
economic laws including those affecting competition.
Cooperative enforcement arrangement under ANZCERTA is the
best ever in that the agreement grants competition
authorities from both countries reciprocal jurisdiction in
either country to investigate and prosecute anticompetitive
See, the discussion oflCEAs on Part III, supra. Note that where those agreements are weakened by lack
of data exchange provisions, they are ineffective due to absence of enforcement mechanisms to compel
compliance.
3
" For instance, see the US/EU merger cases, supra.
33
See, Joanna Shelton, supra, note 294. [The ANZCERTA arrangement allows both countries competition
agencies to hold hearings in either country, and to issue subpoenas and remedial orders enforceable in the
other country.] Note that the unique antitrust law enforcement culture of the US system is the greatest
obstacle hindering international cooperation. See, Part III, supra.
activities and to share confidential data obtained in
either country.
The last set of global actions on forging an
international regime for antitrust occurred within the WTO.
Following the 1993 proposition of a Draft Antitrust Code by
antitrust scholars in Munich, Germany, 334 discussions
escalated within the WTO, for the adoption of a possible
framework. In 1996, the WTO agreed to establish a working
group to examine the relationship between trade and
competition, in order to identify areas that would merit
consideration within the WTO framework. 3 In December 1998,
the working groups released its report specifying areas in
which WTO-based actions are considered necessary. 336
However, it required extension of time beyond the original
two years granted at its inception to complete the work. 337
Characteristically, even though the working group has not
yet made its final observations, the United States has
j4
See, Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement, published and
released July 10, 1993, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628 (Aug. 19, 1993) (Special Supp.).
35
See, WTO Ministerial Conference Singapore, Final declaration (Dec. 13, 1996) reprinted in 36 I.L.M
218(1997).
,0
The working group suggested actions in three areas:
1. "relevance of fundamental WTO principles of national treatment, transparency, and most-
favored-nation treatment to competition policy and vice versa"
2. "approaches to promoting cooperation and communication among members, including the
field of technical cooperation" and
3. "contribution of competition policy to achieving the objectives of the WTO, including the
promotion of international trade."
3/
For a detailed report of the working group, see the web site of the WTO at www.wto.org.
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already registered its opposition towards any arrangement
within the WTO aimed at internationalizing antitrust. 338
b. Nature of a WTO-Based Multilateral Antitrust Agreement
One commentator summarized the rationale for US
Government's opposition to the creation of a WTO-
administered global antitrust regime as follows:
• The WTO is too large and diverse ever to adopt a
common approach to anticompetitive practices in
the context of trade and competition.
• Negotiations to achieve a minimum set of
acceptable principles could lead to the adoption
of a lowest common denominator set of principles
that would weaken existing, more effective rules.
• Businesses and national governments would be
unwilling to turn over competitively sensitive,
confidential business information to WTO
bureaucrats
.
• WTO dispute resolution mechanisms are
inappropriate for review of individual decisions
taken by domestic competition enforcement
authorities because such reviews "could interfere
with national sovereignty concerning
prosecutorial discretion and judicial decision
making, and could also involve the WTO panels in
inappropriate reviews of case-specific, highly
confidential business information." 339
Some developed countries, especially members of OECD, share
most of the foregoing US position. 340 Discussions within the
OECD have highlighted the inadequacies of the sort of
International Antitrust Code contemplated by the Munich
38
See, Joseph Griffin, supra, note 10. See also. Part IV, of this work where four outstanding rationale for
US opposition of WTO-based framework are listed.
3 ^ 9
See, Joseph Griffin, supra, note 10 at 197.
340
See, Joanna Shelton, supra, note 294.
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academic group: 341 There is a significant risk that minimum
standards developed under such a Code would not do justice
to the diversity of competition laws around the world, and
might end up being set at the lowest common denominator
which would be very difficult to improve later. Moreover,
the complex and fact -intensive nature of decision making in
the specific antitrust cases is ill suited to review by
international bodies. Finally, few if any countries appear
to be willing to accept review by an international body of
national antitrust decisions in particular cases. 342
Despite these dim prospects, there are competition-
related provisions affecting certain sectoral agreements
within the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS)
which have already entered into force, 343 the
Telecommunications Agreement, for instance. The success in
the Telecommunications sector could imply that separate
sectoral agreements of this nature would succeed as well if
added as annexes to other WTO Agreements. This could lead
to differing competition rules being applied to the various
WTO Agreements. Such "a proliferation of sector-specific
competition rules could create diverse rules and
41
See, the Draft International Antitrust Code, supra.
42
See, Joanna Shelton, supra, note 294 at 4.
34j
For instance the WTO Telecommunications Agreement contain in its Annex an obligation to allow
service providers of other Members access public telecommunications network "... on reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms and conditions."
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interpretations within a given country." 344 Besides, the
ongoing effort to converge international competition rules
would have been vacated.
The difficulties involved in establishing and managing
a binding competition agreement within the WTO, enforceable
by the world trading body, subject to its supranational
dispute settlement mechanism is easy to appreciate. Unlike,
most pure trade measures, national competition policies in
most cases are utilized by countries as instruments to
effectuate certain national economic goals and social
progress. 345 The fact that these goals are not static, 346 and
are often times not representative of universal standards,
means that national sovereignty over competition regulation
and enforcement would continue to be jealously guarded.
However, this does not dispose of the need to create an
internationally viable standard for competition rules to
regulate activities with cross-border implications. The WTO
is nevertheless, a suitable forum for this endeavor.
Since neither a sectoral approach nor the adoption of
a supranational authority imposing a set of legally binding
rules would work under the WTO, the question of how best to
344
See, Joan Shelton, supra, note 294 at 3.
45
In the EU, competition policy is a tool for furthering the economic integration of the Communities and
creating and maintaining a single market without frontiers.
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tailor multilateral agreements in this area becomes
paramount. Rather than seek agreement on minimum standards,
countries should be made to execute an agreement on what
constitutes the "core principles" of competition. At the
level of convergence of antitrust observed around the globe
today, 347 this sort of agreement would be easy to negotiate
and agree upon. This agreement could include undertakings
by Members to adopt competition law affecting certain types
of practices, for instance all horizontal per se practices.
It could also contain commitments by members to create
effective enforcement institutions, and to ensure that
government bodies do not encourage or sanction conduct that
might violate competition law.
In addition, these core principles should include
fundamental WTO principles, particularly non-discrimination
and transparency. Thus, the treatment of firms at the
national level would be based on non-discriminatory rules
regardless of their form of ownership or place of
incorporation; and the decision-making process would be
open to international evaluation.
One immediate advantage of creating a multilateral
agreement on the core principles of competition at a global
346
For instance, the US antitrust policy was initially aimed at providing consumer welfare. Though the
consumers are still important in US antitrust policies, the current emphasis is on enhancing productive
efficiency of firms.
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level is the consistency it is bound to foster in the
understanding of competition concepts amongst countries.
Thus, across the globe, such concepts as "relevant market,"
"barriers to entry, " "market power, " "abuse of dominant
position" and "monopolization" would have consistent
meanings. During negotiations and beyond, developing
countries that have recently embraced competition law would
get to share in the knowledge and experience of their
developed counterparts. And a forum similar to that
existing under the OECD for advanced member countries could
be developed under the WTO for the exchange of information
and further approximation of other areas of competition law
not within the core principles agreement
.
The "core principles agreement" should also make
provision for comity considerations and possibly include
the positive comity concepts. While it is possible that
without strong enforcement at the center, comity issues may
still be hampered by considerations of national interests,
the concept of transparency to be adopted as a fundamental
aspect of this agreement should ensure that national
actions are open not only to international scrutiny, but
also to queries by the parties affected by it.
347
See. the OECD Report, supra.
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The beauty of this approach is that while signatory
states would bind themselves to observe the core
principles, the actual enforcement of national laws would
not be subject to international dispute settlement.
Competition law would continue to be applied by independent
national competition authorities, accessible to
complainants. However, a WTO body made up of
representatives from signatory states should be created to
coordinate national competition activities and act as a
secretariat for Member country competition agencies. Within
this secretariat, the "core principles agreement" could
provide for filing of merger notifications and exchange of
information between member countries. National
representatives, who would also act as liaisons between
member states, would then consider the importance of those
notifications and information, assessing their
anticompetitive effects, if any, on their respective
nations. Various national actions would then be predicated
on their recommendations.
To bolster the enforcement, which the lack of a WTO-
based, supranational dispute settlement framework would
create, the agreement could on a reciprocal basis, grant a
Contracting Party and its firms the rights to formally
petition the competition authorities of another Contracting
104
party to take action in specific cases. Where this right is
exercised, the competition office of the Contracting Party
petitioned could be obligated to take action or publicly
explain why it chose not to do so. The agreement could also
give the members and private parties uhe right to bring
competition law actions in foreign courts. It has, however,
been claimed that this right of formal petition and
effective private actions already exists in a number of
OECD countries. 348
It is not in deference to the United States, which
adamantly opposes internationalization for fear of losing
antitrust authority to an international body, that a
supranational dispute settlement body is not recommended as
part of the "core principles agreement" . This model is
informed by the perception of genuine difficulties that
such an international judicial body would have in reviewing
competition decisions of national authorities. 349 For
instance, competition policy investigations are long, fact
intensive inquiries, involving a series of complex
judgements, especially in cases assessed under the elusive
rule of reason analysis rather than the simpler per se
illegal approach. It would be a horrific burden to an
48
See. Joanna Shelton, supra, note 294 at 6.
j4S>
See, Joseph Griffin, supra, note 10. [Busine'ss entities would not feel comfortable turning over
confidential corporate information to external entities.]
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outside international panel, however well intentioned,
having no access to ail the necessary information, much of
which would be confidential - involving highly sensitive
strategic planning and trade secrets of firms, to render
valid judgements. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether a
multilateral dispute panel would have the amount of time
necessary to sift through evidence and make judgements
requiring in-depth knowledge of the relevant product and
geographic markets and involving difficult economic
tradeoffs. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that
increased global action in this area would engender
awareness thereby increasing the volume of complaints and
cases that might be brought to such international panel for
review
.
However, through the implementation of the "core
principles agreement" for a number of years, it may be
necessary to strengthen internationally coordinated actions
in global competition. If such future circumstances require
harmonization of the concepts contained in the "core
principles agreement" , the experience and understanding
gained by states during the years of implementing the
agreements would make such international action feasible.
It would be ludicrous to hold off on taking any action in
the meantime until such happenstance. The measure to be
106
adopted under the "core principles agreement" would be
required to generate the sort of international awareness,
cooperation and exchange of information necessary for the
future wholesale harmonization of competition law, if that
ever occurs
.
a. Is Transnational Enforcement Not Necessary?
It is true that real transnational enforcement is
necessary to keep states from defying obligations under any
international agreement. 350 As we saw in the examination of
the EU/US Agreement, cooperative enforcement is highly
handicapped by national interests' considerations by states
and their need to protect citizens and local
corporations. 351 However, the difficulties involved in
subjecting antitrust to international adjudication are
equally compelling. 3 ' : Granting states and private parties
rights of action in the domains of states where the
anticompetitive conduct affecting their trade emanate, is a
workable compromise. However, states not sufficiently
inhibited by the prospect of publicity that this measure
entails, may continue to flaunt international rules
contained in the "core principles agreement," making some
50
See the discussion of the EU/US Agreement in Part III. [States have an understandable tendency to
protect national interests and its national enterprises while dodging international commitments].
51
For a detailed discussion on barriers to internationalization of enforcement, see, Diane Wood, supra, at
303.
352
See, Joseph Griffin, supra, note 10. See also, Diane Wood, supra, note 10 at 303.
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form of international adjudication necessary within the
"core principles agreement" framework.
A good starting point should be to refer to the
already existing system within the WTO for dispute
settlement, 353 where there is a "mechanism already for
punishing violations when discriminatory enforcement or
non-enforcement of competition laws nullify or impair the
trade concessions granted in the various WTO Codes." 354 Even
the United States has a history of resorting to this
mechanism to settle competition related trade dispute. 355
When Kodak filed a complaint with the United States
Trade Representatives (USTR) under Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1975, 356 alleging that the Japanese Government had
systematically permitted anticompetitive activity by Fuji
that interfered with Kodak's ability to invest and sell in
the Japanese market, the United States commenced bilateral
trade talks with Japan aimed at resolving the issue. 357 When
those bilateral negotiations failed, the United States
invoked the WTO's formal dispute resolution processes
against Japan to determine the legality of the latter'
s
53
See, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 112(1994).
354
See, Spencer Waller, supra, note 15 at 399.
355
See, US to Seek Resolution in WTO of Japan Film Market Complaint, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1001
-03 (June 19, 1996) [Details out the US effort to enter WTO consultation procedure after the failure of
bilateral talks by parties].
356 19U.S.C. §§2411-2414.
57
See, US to Seek Resolution in WTO of Japan Film Market Complaint, supra.
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alleged conduct under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and General Agreement on Trade and Services
(GATS) , 358
Evidently, the current dispute settlement mechanism
within the WTO would accommodate competition based disputes
because certain WTO agreements provide that competition
standards be maintained by state parties in their trade
relations. 31 ' By implications, disputes arising between
members states affecting these agreements are legitimately
within the sphere of jurisdiction of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) . The immediate temptation, therefore,
is to subject the proposed "core principles agreement" to
the WTO DSB. But a careful consideration of the peculiar,
fact-based nature of competition law enforcement and other
issues such as confidentiality protections could tame that
temptation. Be that as it may, it is still possible to
include a WTO dispute settlement system within the
framework of the "core principles agreement." This would be
best if done at a review or appellate stage.
358
See, US Moves on Japan Film Case; Seeks One Panel. Delays Second, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1484
(Sept. 25, 1996); U.S. Seeks WTO Panel Proceedings in Dispute Over Japan's Film Market, 13 Int'l trade
Rep. (BNA) 1296(1996).
>4
For instance, article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement, Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) and the
sectoral agreement relating to Telecommunications. See generally, the Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1 12 (1994). See also,
Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8
Minn. J. Global Trade 1 (1999); Andrew W. Shoyer, The Future of WTO Dispute Settlement, 92 Am. Soc'y
Int'l L.Proc. 75(1998).
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Most judicial involvement in national competition law
enforcement is at the appellate level, anyway. 360 At this
stage evaluation of evidence is hardly necessary as the
courts are only involved with resolving questions of law,
except to determine "whether the record contains the
necessary minimum factual basis for a consideration by
court or authority below." 361 Most enforcement actions are
therefore undertaken by competition agencies. 36 ' The "core
principles agreement" model can utilize the WTO DSB, for
appellate purposes only, to review administrative actions
undertaken by the competition authorities in order to
determine their consistency with the core principles
agreement. Where non-compliance is determined, the DSB can
require the relevant authority to reconsider the matter
based on its recommendations as to interpretation of the
"core principles agreement . " In event of further
disagreements, the state party in whose favor the judgment
is given can resort to retaliation or other trade measures
under the WTO available for breach of WTO Rules.
It is only under the foregoing scheme that WTO DSB can
be applied to the "core principles agreement." A system
that would require an international panel within the WTO to
b0
See, John W. Clark, Judicial Enforcement of Competition Law, OECD document available at its
website, www.oecd.0rg//dafclp/Roundtables/Ju2O8.HTM
361
Id.
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evaluate antitrust questions of a strictly factual nature
would hardly succeeed. Worst of all, it would necessitate
the submission of confidential corporate data to the panel,
which most business enterprises would rather avoid.
36:
Id.
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Antitrust extraterritoriality, the act of extending
the application of a nation's antitrust laws to conducts
occurring abroad which affect the nation's domestic
economy, has and continues to generate great interests
amongst countries and legal authors all over the globe. 363
If it was ever believed that states, in reaction to
international conflicts and retaliatory measures following
extraterritoriality, would contain their desires to grant
their domestic law such expansive characteristics, that
belief is virtually non-existent today. 364 Instead, what is
noticeable is an increasing realization among countries
that nearly every trade related legislation having cross-
border dimensions should be vested with powers to deal with
their international aspects. 3 ' Fortunately, some form of
multilateral rules exists at the global level affecting
5J
See, the 1994 OECD Competition Policy Workshop Paper ["the striking features of the last decade of
economic reform in countries ... is the increased interest shown in competition policy as a means of
improving economic performance."]
364
See, Joanna Shelton. supra, note 294. [International rules on competition already exist in some of the
multilateral agreements undertaken within the WTO, for instance the Telecommunications Agreement],
' There are attempts within the US, for mstance, to apply Trade Mark and Franchise laws
extratemtonally. See, Enka Brown, Extraterritorial Application of Trademark Law Under the Lanham
Act: Recent Decisionsfrom the Second Circuit, 1 1 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 55 (1998); Terry W. Schackmann,
Clayton L. Barker, The FTC Act and the Franchise Disclosure rule in Nieman v. Dryclean U.S.A.
Franchise Company, 18-WTR Franchise L.J. 108 (1999).
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most trade laws of countries today. 366 Unfortunately, no
such rules exist for antitrust. 3 ' Efforts to fashion a
global framework in the area of competition law during the
past half Century have all come to naught. 368 However,
international resolve in this area remains unflinching. 369
Various international organizations have select group of
experts currently engaged in elaborate studies and research
relating to internationalization of competition rules. 370
Within the WTO particularly, a special group is working on
the modalities for forming multilateral rules on
competition
.
371
While the outcome of the activities of these
international experts is being awaited, the United States,
a traditional thorn in the flesh of global competition, has
already indicated that it would not support such a move. 372
As far as America is concerned, the best course for dealing
with cross-border antitrust is to secure the cooperation of
antitrust agencies of countries, by means of bilateral
agreement, for the reciprocal enforcement of antitrust
The WTO Treaty now contains agreements on Trade in Goods and Services. Intellectual Property' and
Investments measures are also covered within the WTO.
The only international regime existing on antitrust is that under the EU law where articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome is applicable to its 15 member countries.
b(s
See the discussion of attempts at international level to forge competition rules in Part IV of this work,
supra.
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law. 373 After a half -century of canvassing for bilateral
cooperative instruments amongst countries, only six
countries and one regional organization have concluded any
kind of agreement with the United States on cooperation in
the antitrust field. 374 Four main reasons have been advanced
for the lack of popularity of the US cooperative
mechanism. 3 First, the unique nature of US antitrust law
and enforcement, coupled with its aggressive litigious
judicial process hardly applicable to any other country,
makes it difficult for countries to execute agreements with
the United States based on comparative reciprocity. 376
Secondly, the frightening level of inconsistency in the US
courts on factors determining international antitrust
jurisdiction and the unpredictability of when, if ever,
would foreign interest be taken into account causes foreign
countries to lose faith in US legal process regarding
antitrust. 37 Thirdly, provisions of certain US laws on
international antitrust are considered too self-serving to
provide any serious benefits to states executing bilateral
competition agreements with the United States. 378 Finally,
3
;
3
id.
3,4
These are Canada, Germany, Australia and Israel. Others are Brazil, Japan and the European
Communities.
75
See generally, Part III for the discussion on ICEAs.
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though the threats posed to domestic markets by foreign
anticompetitive conducts have been realized by many states,
their pursuit of such external anticompetitiveness does not
reflect the cutthroat aggressiveness employed by the United
States. 379
However, the analysis of the US cooperative
enforcement agreements, using the EU/US agreement as a
basis, has revealed that those agreements would hardly
result in actual cooperative enforcement actions. 380 For
instance, the consideration of two mergers that occurred in
both jurisdictions showed that obligations under the EU/US
agreements are secondary to their respective national
interests and the need to protect national enterprises
against foreign entities. We also saw that without a strong
enforcement mechanism, there are no guarantees that any
country would comply with agreements, even though binding,
which requires the prosecution of its citizen for violating
alien competition laws at the instance and for the benefit
of foreign governments. 381
One would expect that since the US models of
cooperative enforcement have failed to effectively tackle
cross-border antitrust enforcement, the United States
379
See. James McNeill, supra, note 2.
8u
See, the discussion on EU/US Aereement in Part III, supra.
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authorities would finally abandon its age-old attitude
against instituting international antitrust. Within the
past nine months, the United States has concluded three
cooperative enforcement agreements with Israel, Japan and
Brazil. 382 Because these agreements are similar in content
and form to the 1991 EU/US agreement, they equally provide
weak basis for cross-border antitrust enforcement.
Evidently, It would serve American interest more if
her government joins in the ongoing effort to fashion
international rules for competition. 383 As the necessity for
extraterritoriality remains ever present in today's global
economy, multilateral rules, as opposed to bilateral or
national efforts is what would be needed to avoid the
chaotic situation which differing national measures on
extraterritoriality would cause in future. A model of
multilateral agreement en the "core principles of
antitrust" law suggested in this paper, which operates
without the necessity of international adjudication
framework, would take care of the discomfort and concern of
countries, mainly the US, worried about their loss of
antitrust authority to supranational entities. However, as
some WTO Agreements already contain competition law related
82
See, note 149, supra.
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provisions, the utilization of its DSB becomes unavoidable
in this area. As a result, a suggestion of how to include
the "core principles agreement" within the WTO DSB is made.
If the proposed scheme were accepted, the "core principles
agreement" would sufficiently generate the needed growth as
well as the enforcement of antitrust law at the
international level
.
ij
Events within the WTO signify that eventual rules on global competition are imperative. There are
already certain WTO agreements that contain 'competition rules, making the adoption in other areas a
possibility that is waiting to happen.
REFERENCES
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict ofLaws,
International Law, and Some Suggestions for their Interaction, Recueil des Cours
315(1980).
Gary B. Born, A Appraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 L. &
Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1 (1992).
David Gill, Two Cheersfor Timberlane, 10 Swiss Rev. Int'l. Comp. L.3 (1980).
4. David P. Fidler, Competition Law and International Relations, 41 Int'l & Comp.
L.Q. 563 (1992).
5. Russell J. weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application ofAntitrust & Security
Laws: An inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 Tex. L.
Rev. 1799(1992).
6. Jennifer C. Farlow, Ego or Equity? Examining United States Extension ofthe
Sherman Act, 11 Transnat'l Law. 175 (1998).
Geralyn Trujillo, Mutual Assistance Under the International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act: Obstacles to a United States-Japanese Agreement,
33 Tex. Int'l L. J. 613 at page 623.
8. Robert D. Shank, The Justice Department 's Recent Antitrust Enforcement Policy:
Toward a "Positive Comity" Solution to International Competition Problems? "
29 Vand. J. Transnat'l.
9. Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the
Links of Competition and Trade, 4 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 1.
10. Hon. Christine A. Varney, US FTC Commissioner, The Federal Trade
Commission and International Antitrust, 11-22-96 WLN 12497
1 1
.
Spencer Weber Waller, National Laws and International Markets: Strategies of
Cooperation and Harmonization in the Enforcement of Competition Law, 18
Cardozo L. Rev. 1111.
12. Joseph Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67
Antitrust L.J. 159.
117
118
13. Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real international Antitrust, 1992 U.
Chi. Legal F. 277.
14. Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization ofAntitrust Enforcement, 77
B.U.L. Rev. 343.
15. Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible? 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1501
(1998).
16. Eleanor M. Fox, Trade, Competition, And Intellectual Property - TRIPS and Its
Antitrust Counterparts, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 481.
17. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New
Protectionism: The Needfor a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com.
Reg. 393.
18. Daniel J. Gifford, The Draft International Antitrust Code Proposed at Munich:
Good Intentions Gone Awry, 6 Minn. J. Global Trade 1.
19. Larry Kramer, Vestiges ofBeale: Extraterritorial Application ofAmerican Law,
1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 179, 182 (1992)
20. Jennifer Quinn, Sherman Gets Judicial Authority to go Global: Extraterritorial
Jurisdictional Reach ofUS Antitrust Laws are Expanded, 32 J. Marshall L. Rev.
141.
21. Edward L. Rholl, Inconsistent Application ofthe Extraterritorial Provisions of
the Sherman Act: A Judicial Response Based Upon the Much Maligned "Effects "
Test, 73 Marq. L. Rev.
22. Prabhaker Reddy, The Extraterritorial Application ofUS Antitrust Law and the
United Kingdom 's Reaction, 3 Emory J. Int'l Disp. Resol. 221.
23. Joseph Griffin, Foreign Government Reactions to US Assertions of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 505.
24. Roscoe B. Starek, International Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement and Other
International Antitrust Developments, 11-29-96 WLN 12731 (Nov. 1996).
25. Adian Robertson & Marie Demetriou, "But That was in Another Country: " The
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws in the US Supreme Court, 43
Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 417 (1994).
119
26. John H Chung, The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of1994
and the Maelstrom Surrounding the Extraterritorial Application ofthe Sherman
Act, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 371.
27. Edmund Hosker, First Secretary, British Embassy, Remarks to the Int'l Bar Ass'n
(Oct. 12, 1993), reported in Nat'l L. J., Nov.l, 1993.
28. Dean Brockbank, The 1995 International Antitrust Guidelines: The Reach ofUS
Antitrust Law Continues to Expand, 2 J. Int'l Legal Stud.l.
29. Robert G. Shimp, A Critical Review ofthe Justice Department 's 1988 Antitrust
Guidelinesfor International Operations, 14 N.CJ Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 287 at
304.
30. Daniel A. Austin, International Enforcement in the Clinton Administration, 88
Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 89.
3 1
.
ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (Jan. 26, 1977), reprinted in Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Vol. 50, NO. 799, at E-l (Feb. 1, 1977).
32. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (Nov. 10, 1988),
reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Vol. 54, NO. 1391, at S-l (Nov.
17, 1988). Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, reprinted in Joseph P.
Griffin, US International Antitrust Enforcement: A Practical Guide to the Justice
Department Guidelines, 53 Corp. Prac. Ser. (BNA) at B-181, B-193, s 3.34 (Apr.
5, 1995).
33. Charles S. Stark, International Cooperation in the Pursuit of Cartels, 6 Geo.
Mason L. Rev. 533.
34. Eleanor M. Fox, The End ofAntitrust Isolationism: The Vision ofOne World,
1992 U. Chi. Legal F. 221.
35. Loraine L. Laudati & Todd J. Friedbacher, Trading Secrets: The International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, 16 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 478.
36. Joseph P. Griffin, EC/US Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Impact On
Transnational Business, 24 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1051.
37. James F. Rill, US, EC Commission Forge Antitrust Cooperation Accord, 61
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 375 (Sept. 26, 1991).
120
38. Laura E. Keegan, The 1991 US/EU Competition Agreement: A Glimpse ofthe
Future Through the United States v. Microsoft Corp. Window, 2 J. Int'l Legal
Stud. 149.
39. William Hall, Ciba, Sandoz in US Deal to Speed Merger, Financial Times, Aug.
29, 1996, at 1 1, available in LEXIS, World Library, Fintme file.
40. James R. Atwood, Positive Comity - Is It Positive Step? 1 992 FORDHARM
CORP. L. INST. 79, 87 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1993)
41. Joanna R. Shelton, Competition Policy: Wlxat Chancefor International Rules?
OECD organized Wilton Park Conference 545 on The Global Trade Agenda, 25 th
November 1998, UK, reported in http://www.oecd.org//daf/clp/Speeches/JS-
WILTO.htm at 8-11
42. Dale B. Furnish, A transnational Approach to Restrictive Business Practices, 4
IntTLavv. 317, 318-22(1970).
43. Clair Wilcox, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 46-49 (MacMillan, 1949).
15, 1994, 33I.L.M 112(1994).
44. Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of
the First Three Years, 8 Minn. J. Global Trade 1.
45. Andrew W. Shoyer, The Future of WTO Dispute Settlement, 92 Am. Soc'y Int'l
L. Proc. 75.
46. John W. Clark, Judicial Enforcement of Competition Law, OECD document
available at its website, www.oecd.org
47. Erika Brown, Extraterritorial Application of Trademark Law Under the Lanham
Act: Recent Decisionsfrom the Second Circuit, 1 1 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 55.
48. Terry W. Schackmann, Clayton L. Barker, The FTC Act and the Franchise
Dosclosure rule in Nieman v. Dryclean U.S.A. Franchise Company, 18-WTR
Franchise L.J. 108.
